Institutional Analysis of Water Management for Agriculture in the Chancay-Lambayeque Basin, Peru by Rubinos, Cathy Alida (Author) et al.
Institutional Analysis of Water Management for Agriculture 
in the Chancay-Lambayeque Basin, Peru  
by 
Cathy Rubinos 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved July 2013 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Joshua Abbott, Co-Chair 
Hallie Eakin, Co-Chair 
Abigail York 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
August 2013  
   i 
ABSTRACT  
   
This research presents an analysis of the main institutions and economic 
incentives that drive farmers behaviors on water use in the Chancay-Lambayeque basin, 
located in Lambayeque (Peru), a semi arid area of great agricultural importance. I focus 
my research on identifying the underlying causes of non-collaborative behaviors in 
regard to water appropriation and infrastructure provisioning decision that generates 
violent conflicts between users. Since there is not an agreed and concrete criteria to 
assess “sustainability” I used economic efficiency as my evaluative criteria because, even 
though this is not a sufficient condition to achieve sustainability it is a necessary one, and 
thus achieving economic efficiency is moving towards sustainable outcomes. Water 
management in the basin is far from being economic efficient which means that there is 
some room for improving social welfare. Previous studies of the region have successfully 
described the symptoms of this problem; however, they did not focus their study on 
identifying the causes of the problem. In this study, I describe and analyze how different 
rules and norms (institutions) define farmers behaviors related to water use. For this, I use 
the Institutional Analysis and Development framework and a dynamic game theory 
model to analyze how biophysical attributes, community attributes and rules of the 
system combined with other factors, can affect farmers actions in regard to water use and 
affect the sustainability of water resources. Results show that water rights are the factor 
that is fundamental to the problem. Then, I present an outline for policy recommendation, 
which includes a revision of water rights and related rules and policies that could increase 
the social benefits with the use of compensation mechanisms to reach economic 
efficiency. Results also show that commonly proposed solutions, as switch to less water 
   ii 
intensive and more added value crops, improvement in the agronomic and entrepreneurial 
knowledge, or increases in water tariffs, can mitigate or exacerbate the loss of benefits 
that come from the poor incentives in the system; but they do not change the nature of the 
outcome.   
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Chancay – Lambayeque basin, located in Lambayeque and Cajamarca, is one 
of the most important basins in Peru because of its vast geographic extent (see figure 1). 
It is located in a semi-arid region with low precipitation, which makes agriculture, as a 
water-intensive activity, challenging. Nevertheless, agriculture is the main activity in the 
basin and uses 89% of available water to grow mostly water intensive crops: rice (39%), 
sugar cane (38%) and cotton (7%) (ANA 2008).  
 
Water is scarce in the basin. Water scarcity manifests in two different ways. First, 
despite the availability of irrigation, instead of farming in two full seasons per year, 
farmers grow crops in only one full season, and then one short season. In drought years 
farmers are forced to reduce their production even more1. Second, water for irrigation use 
competes with domestic water use, and according to Alfaro (2008), the total demand in 
rural areas is not satisfied (in some districts of the region, like Manuel Mesones Disitrict, 
75% of the population does not have access to potable water for domestic consumption). 
 
Water scarcity not only implies unsustainable use of water resources, but also that 
the region is facing a limit to sustainable development. The effects of water scarcity are 
manifested in: (1) deaths due to malnourishment and water-related disease; (2) violent 
conflicts among users; (3) degradation of ecosystems, salinization, erosion; and (4) 
                                                
1 Information acquired from the scope analysis.  
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limited economic growth because water is essential as an input to almost all productive 
activities (Alfaro, 2008; ANA, 2008). Poor water management, especially in regions of 
agricultural dependency, as the Chancay-Lambayeque basin, may cause poverty traps2 
(Hussain, 2007).  
 
Additionaly, water problems in the basin are associated with inefficiencies in 
water use, which are strongly related to how water is managed in the basin. Managing 
water is a challenge and its success depends on its institutional design (Ostrom, 1990). By 
“institutions” I refer to rules, norms, and shared strategies that affect human behavior 
(Crawford & Ostrom, 1995).  
 
Because farming activity is highly concentrated around the main canal of the 
basin, the Taymi Canal, my research focus on the use of water from the canal, which is 
almost entirely for irrigation purposes3. Moreover, non-collaborative behaviors in regard 
to water appropriation and payment of water tariffs are causing violent conflicts among 
users around the canal. Then I also focus this research on those non-collaborative 
behaviors.  
 
 
                                                
2  A poverty trap is a situation in which it is very difficult for people to leave poverty due to a lack 
of resources (capital, knowledge, etc.), and in which it may also be very difficult to acquire them, creating a 
self-reinforcing cycle of poverty (Carpenter and Brock 2008). 
3 However, it use competes with domestic water use that is delivered by other means.	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Previous research on water management in the Chancay- Lambayeque basin (e.g., 
Alfaro, 2008; ANA, 2008; Regional Presidency, 2010) clearly describes water scarcity in 
the region, and the conflicts that currently revolve around water use. These studies 
outline the symptoms of the problems, but do not analyze the underlying causes. Without 
such an analysis, any solutions to the observed problems are unlikely to be successful.  
For this reason, I analyze how the institutional design affects management and farmers’ 
behaviors in regard to water use, in an effort to better understand the causes current 
conflicts in the basin. Then, I discover how to improve these institutions to move towards 
a sustainable water management for agriculture in the basin.  
 
Since there is not an agreed and concrete criterion to assess “sustainability” I use 
economic efficiency in this research as my evaluative criteria, because although this is 
not a sufficient condition to achieve sustainability it is a necessary condition4. Thus 
achieving economic efficiency is moving towards sustainable outcomes (Stavins, Wagner 
& Wagner, 2003). 
 
 To analyze how the institutional design affects farmers behaviors, I use the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework proposed by Ostrom (2009). 
The IAD framework is useful for understanding a wide variety of institutional 
arrangements (Imperial & Yandle, 2005), because it considers a variety of factors that 
help researchers generate the questions that need to be posed to analyze how water is 
                                                
4 Economic efficiency looks for non-wasteful outcomes in a sense that it seeks to achieve a 
resource allocation such us the social welfare is maximized and that no actor is worse off when changing 
the status quo.    
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managed. The IAD enable the study of different components that are normally unnoticed 
in previous studies such as the interconnection between rules as water rights and farmers’ 
behavior. In this sense, the IAD is a framework for thinking about a complex socio-
ecological system, that it is particularly well suited to understanding the impacts of 
institutional design on the system and feedbacks from the system to institutional design.  
Nevertheless, the IAD is not a model in itself, but rather provides a common structure for 
more focused modeling. 
 
In many complex socio-ecological systems, such as the one that I present in this 
research, the number of variables that simultaneously affect individual behaviors is quite 
large, and these variables are related in a complex way. In order to achieve precise logical 
conclusions and sound quantitative and qualitative predictions of actors’ choices, it is 
necessary to identify and analyze the exact configuration of key variables in a formal 
model. Otherwise, informal reasoning may lead to broad insights or conclusions that are 
not logically valid (Ostrom, Gardner & Walker, 1994). Thus, this study incorporates a 
dynamic game theory model that will be enriched by qualitative analysis. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review related to water management challenges 
and the importance of institutions as generators of conditions that provides different 
incentives, with a particular focus on the role of institutions of propery rights. In chapters 
3 and 4 I explain the design of the research and how I collected the data. I used secondary 
data and 21 interviews of actors related water management or farming activity in the 
basin to inform the IAD framework. In chapter 5, I present how the IAD framework helps 
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to organize the analysis of the case study. Here I present the results of how biophysical 
attributes, community attributes and rules of the system, combined with other factors can 
affect farmers’ actions in regard to water use and affect the sustainability of water 
resources. In chapter 6 I present the model that I have built to be used to further analysis 
and I analyze it in chapter 7. In chapter 8, I discuss results and present an outline for 
policy recommendations, which include a revision of water rights and related rules. 
Finally in chapter 9, I share some concluding thoughts.  
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Chapter 2 
THE WATER MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
INSTITUTIONS 
Water systems are often characterized, as in this case, as common-pool resources 
(CPRs), a type of good defined by two characteristics (see figure 2): They can be used by 
more than one person or agent at the same time and/or over time, while excluding them 
from doing so is difficult or costly (non-excludability), and the use of the resource 
reduces the amount available for others (subtractability) (Ostrom et al., 1994).   
 
Figure 2. Types of Goods by Ostrom et al. (1994)) 
 
 Characteristics of non-excludability and subtractability present serious problems 
that are explained with rational choice theory. Rational choice theory states that 
individuals are driven by the goal of maximizing their well-being (Shughart, 2008ed.). 
This does not mean that they do not care about their families, friends, and community, 
because individual’s well-being might depend on others’ well-being, among other factors. 
Maximizing their well-being means that people do their best to satisfy their preference 
and needs under prevailing circumstances (Green, 2002).  
 
In cases where cooperation is not fostered, rational users will maximize their own 
well-being by trying to get as much as possible from the resource (because if they do not 
!"# $%&'
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others will consume it). However, because the good is also substractable, when users 
appropriate the good the availability of the good decreases (Ostrom, 2005). This effect is 
also known as the appropriation externality (Ostrom, et al., 1994). 
 
Moreover, in many water systems, users build infrastructure to take a better 
advantage of water resources. In these cases, it is difficult to exclude users from benefits 
from infrastructure. However, maintaining those benefits has a cost that not everyone 
may be interested in paying because they may hope that others will pay for it (Olson 
1965). This free-riding behavior will not always happen, but it is very likely to happen 
when users cannot easily be excluded for not contributing to the provisioning of the 
infrastructure maintenance (Ostrom, 2005). In this cases users will be facing a provision 
problem.  
 
Then, in presence of appropriation externalities and provisioning problems, users 
may act in a non cooperative way that leads to inefficient outcomes – outcomes in which 
there is potential to make someone better off without making anyone else worse off. In 
such cases, cooperation will led to more desirable outcomes not only collectively but also 
individually (Ostrom, 2007). However, by definition it is difficult to control the resource 
use for CPRs, and since users will be acting independently, they may not achieve an 
efficient outcome.  
 
Hardin (1968) in his classic article “The tragedy of the commons” explains that in 
a situation in which multiple individuals, acting independently and rationally in 
   9 
consideration of their own self-interest, a shared limited resource will ultimately be 
depleted, even when it is clear that it is not in anyone's long-term interest for this to 
happen. With this thought, many scholars proposed that successful CPRs management 
could be only achieved with policy interventions that impose government or private 
ownership (Poteete & Ostrom, 2002; Gibson, McKean & Ostrom, 2000). 
 
Later, solid empirical evidence in regard to self-governance of CPRs (e.g. Lam 
(2005), Olson (1965), Dietz, Ostrom & Stern (2003) and specially Ostrom (1990)) stated 
that collective action is a valid option for communities to cope with CPRs problems and 
ensure its sustainability (Castillo & Saysel, 2005). They also showed that government 
intervention could sometimes frustrate the success of systems around CPRs, when users 
can organize themselves to create and enforce rules that protect natural resources 
(Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1990; Bromley et al., 1992). CPRs can be a government 
property (by a national, regional or local government); privately owned (by individuals or 
corporations) or owned by communal groups. The literature shows that no form of 
ownership is better than the other; but what is key for having a successful CPRs 
management are well-defined property rights (Schlager & Ostrom 1992).  
 
Property rights are institutions that define the different privileges conceded to 
individuals to specific resources, such as water, land, fishes, etc. (Libecap, 1989). These 
privileges may involve a variety of rights, including the right to enter to a territory, to 
withdrawal or to appropriate the benefits from use or investment in the resource, the right 
to manage the resource, the right to decide who have rights to access the resource, and the 
   10 
rights to transfer other rights in a market (Ostrom, 2005, Libecap, 1989). The allocation 
of property rights, then, affects decision-making regarding resource use and, thus, affects 
actors’ behavior and outcomes (Libecap, 1989). North (1978), De Alessi (1980), Libecap 
(1986), and Ostrom (1990) among others, studied how various property rights 
arrangements affect systems performance, which ranges from wasteful practices 
associated with open-access (when no one or everyone owns CPRs) or with property 
rights that do not suit local characteristics and values, to wealth – maximizing actions 
possible with well defined property rights.  
 
Property rights as rules are one type of institution, but not the only institution that 
affects the success of CPR management. Consistent findings of many studies manifest 
that identifying well-defined property rights implies understanding local biophysical, 
social, and economic conditions (Ostrom, 1999; Meinzen-Dick, 2007) and it is because of 
this that there is no panacea – no one way - to organize irrigation activities (Chambers, 
1988; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al, 2007; Levine, 1980; Coward, 1979; Uphoff, 1986; 
Maass & Anderson, 1978). Thus in order to come up with a successful institutional 
design related to the supply and use of water systems it is necessary to understand how 
different variables build an incentive structure that affect system outcomes (Libecap, 
1989). This is the aim of my research: to study how the Chancay- Lambayeque water 
system is affected by current water rights in combination of other factors as biophysical 
attributes, community attributes and other related rules.  
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For this end, I apply the IAD framework to a case of conflict between upstream 
and downstream farmers over irrigation water from the Taymi Canal, the main canal of 
the system.  I focus my analysis on two aspects of the conflict: (1) water appropriation, 
because upstream farmers water use is unregulated, and (2) the common irrigation 
infrastructure provisioning, because upstream farmers are not contributing to this end. I 
use the IAD framework because it provides a guideline on how to combine the analysis 
of factors (e.g. crops produced, rules, norms, agricultural knowledge, equity issues, etc.) 
that affect farmers’ behaviors on these two aspects of the conflict.  I hypothesize that 
improved property rights – which implies assigning regulated irrigation water access and 
water infrastructure maintenance responsibilities to upstream farmers – could lead to a 
more sustainable allocation of water among users, and thus reduce disputes among them. 
I explore this hypothesis and other proposed solutions using a game theoretic model on 
chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD)  
Frameworks operate at the broadest possible specificity level for theoretical 
analysis. Frameworks identify the elements and their relationships needed to consider for, 
in this case, institutional analysis; and they also organize diagnostics and prescriptive 
inquiry. Frameworks are useful to compare theories and to identify the “universal 
elements that any theory relevant to the same kind of phenomena needs to include” 
(Ostrom, 2011). The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework proposed 
by E. Ostrom (2009) identifies a common set of variables that affect incentives on 
different behaviors in regard to water use (or CPRs in general), and helps to identify the 
important variables and their impacts on the patterns of interaction among water users. 
For this research I use the IAD framework because it helps to understand and test how 
rational choice theory and property rights theory explain current outcomes considering 
local conditions in the Chancay-Lambayeque basin.  
 
Figure 3. A Framework for Institutional Analysis by Ostrom (2011) 
 
Thus, a key part of the framework is the identification of an action situation and
the resulting patterns of interactions and outcomes, and evaluating these outcomes
(see right half of Figure 1). The problem could be at an operational tier where actors
interact in light of the incentives they face to generate outcomes directly in the world.
Examples of operational problems include:
• Evaluating the service production agencies servingmetropolitan areas (Oakerson
& Parks, 2011).
• Exploring why day care centers vary substantially in delivering child care ser-
vices (Bushouse, 2011).
• The question of how to invest in irrigation infrastructures so that capital invest-
ments enhance, rather than detract from, the organizational capabilities of local
farmers (Joshi, Ostrom, Shivakoti, & Lam, 2000; Shivakoti et al., 2005).
Biophysical
Conditions
Attributes of
Community
Rules-in-Use
Interactions
Outcomes
Evaluative
Criteria
External Variables
Action
Situations
Figure 1. A Framework for Institutional Analysis.
Source: Adapted from E. Ostrom (2005, p. 15).
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ACTIONS
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CONTROL
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Figure 2. The Internal Structure of an Action Situation.
Source: Adapted from E. Ostrom (2005, p. 33).
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The starting point of the IAD framework, and the core of analysis is the action 
arena that considers actors interacting in an action situation, which is a social space (see 
figure 3). Ostrom defines a common set of variables used to describe the structure of an 
action situation: (1) the set of actors, (2) the actors’ positions or roles (e.g. irrigation 
association members vs. those who are not), (3) actors decisions and their outcomes,  (4) 
outcomes as a result of actions, (5) actors’ level of control over choice (e.g. some actors 
may take decisions on water withdrawal by their own, others can act collaboratively), (6) 
cost and benefits related to outcomes and, (7) available information (see figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. The Internal Structure of an Action Situation by Ostrom (2011)  
 
Moreover, Ostrom presents three types of external factors that affect the action 
situations and the outcomes: (1) the conditions of physical world (e.g. how much water is 
available, type of crops that are grown, etc.), (2) the rules that govern the action arena, 
which include formal (written) or informal (norms) and; (3) the structure (or 
characteristics) of the community (e.g. shared values, homogeneity of their members).  
 The IAD framework only outlines the categories of variables that are relevant to the 
Thus, a key part of the framework is the identification of an action situation and
the resulting patterns of interactions and outcomes, and evaluating these outcomes
(see right half of Figure 1). The problem could be at an operational tier where actors
interact in light of the incentives they face to generate outcomes directly in the world.
Examples of operational problems include:
• Evaluating the service production agencies servingmetropolitan areas (Oakerson
& Parks, 2011).
• Exploring why day care centers vary substantially in delivering child care ser-
vices (Bushouse, 2011).
• The question of how to invest in irrigation infrastructures so that capital invest-
ments enhance, rather than detract from, the organizational capabilities of local
farmers (Joshi, Ostrom, Shivakoti, & Lam, 2000; Shivakoti et al., 2005).
Biophysical
Conditions
Attributes of
Community
Rules-in-Use
Interactions
Outcomes
Evaluative
Criteria
External Variables
Action
Situations
Figure 1. A Framework for Institutional Analysis.
Source: Adapted from E. Ostrom (2005, p. 15).
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CONTROL
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AND BENEFITS
assigned to
POTENTIAL
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External Variables
Figure 2. The Internal Structure of an Action Situati n.
Source: Adapted from E. Ostrom (2005, p. 33).
10 Policy Studies Journal, 39:1
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problem and the relationship among variables. In order to explore how variables relate in 
a specific geographic context and in relation to simulated changes in institutional 
arrangements, further analysis is required. One method of analysis that fits well with the 
IAD framework is game theory modeling (Ostrom, 2011). In general, models 
complement qualitative research by enabling the researcher to arrive at precise logical 
conclusions through analyzing the variables of the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005); 
specifically, game theory helps to examine individuals’ incentives to collaborate or not in 
the two type of dilemmas that I am analyzing in this research: Appropriation and 
Provision problems. Thus, in this research I use a dynamic game theory model in order to 
analyze how the variables of the IAD framework determine a certain incentive structure 
for the Chancay- Lambayeque community and determine why and when farmers will be 
aiming to collaborate. 
Dynamic Game Theory Model 
Game theoretic models are used for predictions about agents’ behaviors and to 
compare different possible outcomes.  To arrive at such predictions, the models 
incorporate theories and assumptions for a set of variables and parameters (e.g. the 
strategy sets available to all players, their state of knowledge, the positions of the players, 
the rules of the game (institutions), among others) (Ostrom, 2011). Game theory models 
fit well with the IAD framework because the basic elements of games are the seven 
components of the action situation (Selten 1975; Shubik 1982; Ostrom, Gardner and 
Walker 1994). Also, game theoretic models help to understand how changes in external 
variables (biophysical characteristics, rules, norms and community’s attributes) may 
affect the performance of a system (Ostrom, et al. 1994). Thus, game theory models 
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enable the analysis of strategic actions for decision makers, helping them develop more 
broadly acceptable solutions (Madani, 2010).   
 
 Game theory builds on rational choice theory because it claims that everyone will 
pursue their own well-being and that can lead to a cooperative or non-cooperative 
behavior (Shughart, 2008ed.). Thus, it is helpful for explaining why sometimes actors’ 
decisions and behaviors might appear to be irrational, because actors do not attain the 
maximum outcome that they could have attained (individually and collectively) if they 
had only made different decisions (Messick & Brewer 1983). Game theory helps explain 
how decision makers’ rational behavior, aimed at maximizing their own goals, might 
result in overall Pareto-inferior5 outcomes. Likewise, game theory explains cooperative 
behaviors by understanding how incentive structures can allow agents to maximize their 
individual benefit when collaborating (Madani, 2010).  
 
 With a game theoretic model, we mathematically describe a social situation in 
which two or more actors interact. In cases where there are more than two actors there 
may be collusion among subsets of the players. Still, there are many other characteristics 
that define different kinds of models. There may involve several sequential periods or one 
period for each player, situations may be repeated or be faced only once, it could be static 
or dynamic, etc. In this study I use a dynamic, two-periods discrete game because it helps 
us understand how the incentive structure (action situation) experienced in each time 
                                                
5 Pareto Efficiency: A situation in which no one can be made better off without making someone else 
worse off. Pareto inferior means that it is not Pareto efficient (Perman et al. 2003). 	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period is affected by actors’ actions, outcomes and shocks in the external factors. It will 
specifically help us understand how payoffs of one actor can be affected by other actors’ 
actions over time.  
 
 In this two-step model, players will face the decision of how much to invest in the 
common irrigation infrastructure in the first period, and in the second period the will have 
to decide how much water they will individually withdraw from the canal. This is a 
stylized representation of the reality, where we can observe two types of externalities 
connected to the decisions that players will make: appropriation and provision 
externalities. Addressing appropriation problems implies focusing on the allocation of the 
flow of water, and addressing provision problems implies focusing on the creation or 
maintenance of irrigation infrastructure. Normally provision problems are left out of 
analysis or studied separately from appropriation problems (Lee, 1994), but they are 
highly interdependent and linked to successful self-governed irrigation water systems 
(Gardner, Ostrom, & Walker 1990; Ostrom, 1990).  
 
Although the ability of game theory to represent the Chancay-Lambayeque Basin 
is real, it is not exempt of criticism. One major critique is the assumption of agents’ 
rationality. Some critics argue that individuals are not entirely rational all the time and 
that research should include a bounded rationality analysis (Mccubbins, 1996). However, 
there are situations in which even if we used weak rationality assumptions, such as 
bounded rationality, we could obtain the same outcome we would if we used full 
rationality assumptions, due to the effects of learning, actors’ heterogeneity, natural 
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selection and statistical averaging (Tsebellis, 1990). Moreover, while the critiques are 
valid, the goal of using a game theoretic model, and models in general, is not to describe 
the reality in all its complexity, but to gain insights of the implications of the essential 
structure of a situation, and thus simplification is required. Beyond this balance, there is a 
tradeoff between the complexity added to a model, and the insights we can get from it.  
 
Similarly, we should answer in the same way to critiques regarding the definition 
of payoffs. All those may not be perfectly captured by the game model because it is 
difficult to solve game theoretic models featuring the extremely difficult mathematical 
expressions that would be necessary to capture all individual benefits derived from 
cultural traditions or specifics values (Ostrom, 2005). Also, complicated attitudes toward 
risk or discount rates are difficult to calculate and be incorporated into game theoretic 
models (Ostrom, 1990; Martin, 1978).  
 
Game theoretic models’ conclusions and predictions are a sound first step in 
understanding the implications for agent behavior and system outcomes of institutional 
design features – even if additional refinements are necessary (Ostrom et al., 1994). The 
fact that game theoretic models are not intended to capture reality in all its integrity does 
not invalidate nor deny their ability to offer us a plausible method for understanding the 
effects of how agents behave and the actual effects of institutions as designed and 
enforced in real situations. 
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Chapter 4 
DATA COLLECTION PROCESS  
My data collection process entailed a review of existing published literature, 
interviews with key actors and experts in the region, and the identification of relevant 
secondary data necessary for my analysis and model development.  First, I undertook a 
comprehensive review of published studies that illustrated the water problems of the 
region, specifically that narrated conflicts in the area (Alfaro 2008), and that attempted to 
diagnose problems associated with water management (ANA, 2008; Bustamante, 2010). 
Then I conducted field research in the Chancay- Lambayeque Basin in December 2012. I 
interviewed ten downstream farmers (tailenders), one upstream farmer (headenders)6, one 
agricultural engineer, two water managers, one representative of the irrigation users 
association, two representatives from the national water authority, three agro-exporters 
representatives, two representatives from the agricultural ministry and one mayor (for the 
complete interview protocol, see appendix A). The main objective of the field research 
was to confirm, correct and complement the review of existing studies of the basin, and 
to contact different actors for further interaction. In March 2013 I contacted some of the 
actors I had previously interviewed to confirm the results of data I had processed and to 
fill knowledge gaps.  
 
The information I gathered in the field was used to complement the literature 
review and to redefine the problem. To this end, I used the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework. Then I constructed a modified game theory model for 
                                                
6 Since they are not in the formal sector I experienced some difficulties in contacting more 
upstream farmers.  
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Common Pool Resources (CPR) applied to water management, capturing the main 
characteristics of the region. With this model I was able to understand the current 
dynamics of the system as well as perform some prospective analyses of changes in water 
management policies.  
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Chapter 5 
THE CHANCAY–LAMBAYEQUE BASIN’S INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
The biophysical and social context of the Chancy-Lambayeque Basin, and the 
institutional arrangements governing water use, are complex. In this chapter, I describe 
this context and governing institutions in detail, organizing my description according to 
the key variables featured in the IAD framework. In my description below, I use capital 
letters to signal how attributes of the Chancy-Lambayque Basin case study correspond to 
variables of IAD framework summarized in figures 9 and 10 shown at the end of this 
section.  
Case Study findings 
Location and main biophysical attributes  (H). The Chancay-Lambayeque 
Basin is situated in a semi arid area with very little precipitation in northwest Peru, and it 
has three defined areas: A valley in the lower region (coast) of Lambayeque region; the 
middle-elevation area shared by Lambayeque and Cajamarca regions, and the high-
elevation area (highlands located in Cajamarca. The valley is the most important irrigated 
area of the basin with 118,523 ha. of irrigated land. For this reason, I will focus this study 
in the valley of the Lambayeque region (H3).  Also, my main focus is on agriculture 
activity because it is the main consumer of water, using a share of 89% of total water use 
(ANA, 2010; see table 1). 
 
The main river of the basin is the Chancay River (H2) and it has an extension of 
5,309 Km2 (see figure 5) and the main components of the hydrological infrastructure 
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(H4) are Tinajones Project Hydrological System7, the Taymi Canal (see figure 6) and the 
Tinajones Reservoir (see figure 7).  
 
Table 1  
Water Demand in the Chancay - Lambayeque Basin8 
 
 
Note. From National Authority of Water (ANA) 
 
In 1964 the Peruvian Government built the Tinajones reservoir, recognizing the 
importance of agriculture in the basin and the need to build an irrigation system for its 
development. Later, in 1975 the government, with farmers’ participation, built the Taymi 
canal to bring water from the Chancay River to farmlands that were located near the coast 
(Regional Government, 2012). Farmers who were actively farming at that time were 
located downstream and to right side of the canal (A).  
 
Most of these farmers previously used to be workers of bigger farms that were 
expropriated during the land reform, and the land was redistributed to workers. In 1992, 
acknowledging the need for organized water management the farmers formed the 
                                                7	  See Appendix B for a full description of the infrastructure	  
8	  Million cubic meters (MCM)	  
Sector Demand in 2001 (MCM) % Share
Agriculture 1550.13 89%
Domestic Use 86.76 5%
Industry 25.2 1%
Mining 0.5 0%
Min Ecological Requirement 78.4 5%
Total Demand 1740.99 100%
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Irrigation Association of Chancay- Lambayeque (JUCHL). In compliance with the 
Legislative Decree9 653, an Act that promoted private investment in the agricultural 
sector, the JUCHL was placed in charge of infrastructure maintenance, tariff charge, 
water allocation, among other duties. The JUCHL now represents around 3,500 farmers 
(B). 
 
Later, through the Law Decree10 Nº 25986 (“Budget of the Public Sector Law of 
1993”) the government created the Olmos -Tinajones Special Project as an agency that 
depends on the Presidential Ministry and the National Development Institute (INADE). 
The main goal of this project is the design and implementation of hydropower and 
irrigation systems to improve the economic development of irrigated land. They are also 
the supervising entity of the JUCHL in regard to the infrastructure maintenance. The 
entity that supervises and co-manages water allocation and appropriation with the 
JUCHL is the National Water Authority  (ANA) through the local agency Local Water 
Authority (ALA – Chancay Lambayeque).  
 
                                                
9 In Peru, a Legislative Decree is an executive order of national application, issued by the 
President and the cabinet when granted powers by Congress to directly pass legislation 
10 In Peru, a Law Decree is an executive order issued by the President and the cabinet but not 
previously authorized by Congress. In 1992, pressured by political inaction and radical opposition in both 
chambers of Congress, President Fujimori closed the Peruvian Congress and called for elections for a 
Constitutional Assembly which later in 1993 passed the new and current Peruvian Constitution, under 
which a new Congress -comprised of only one chamber of congressmen- was elected shortly after. During 
the time of Constitutional Assembly and new Congress election, the executive branch under Fujimori 
directly passed Law Decrees, when rules of the hierarchy of a Law of Congress were needed. Law decrees 
passed during that time -covering many fields- remain in force, except where amended by subsequent 
Congress legislation. 
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Recent demographic (B) and hydrological change (H). The Valley Surface is 
3,037 km2, and it holds a population of 735,840 citizens (Regional Presidency, 2010). 
Even though there is no information about migration into the basin, there are signs of 
significant migrations from rural to urban areas of the valley. As we can see in table 3, 
population is expected to grow at high rates (Regional Presidency, 2010). Population 
growth in a context of diminishing water availability increases stress on the water 
resource, especially when the allocation of water for domestic use already does not 
satisfy the total demand in rural areas (in some districts of the region, like Manuel 
Mesones Disitrict, 75% of the population doesn’t have access to potable water for 
domestic consumption (Alfaro, 2008) 
 
Table 2 
 Chancay - Lambayeque Basin: Projected Population 2000 – 2020  
Note. From Regional Presidency (2010) 
 
  Moreover, the region is highly vulnerable to extreme events as droughts and 
floods, and these are linked to the El Niño Southern Oscillation phenonmenon. The last 
El Niño event that took place in the basin was in 1998, and it affected agriculture in many 
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Figure 6. The Taymi Canal 
 
 
Figure 7. Tinajones Reservoir 
 
 26 
ways: reducing GDP by 13%, damaging many types of infrastructure and taking 150,000 
lives (ANA, 2010). Also, as stated by Bustamante (2010), this region is highly vulnerable 
to climate change. Changes in precipitation are expected to increase water shortages in 
the Basin. Moreover, because of deforestation, the system has reduced its capacity to 
capture rainwater and at the same time, deforestation has made it is more vulnerable to 
floods (Bustamante, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, there is a project to expand the Tinajones reservoir’s capacity 
and also to build a smaller reservoir (H4). These projects would not only be useful for 
collecting and storing water in a normal year, but also for preventing catastrophes as 
floods when experiencing El Niño events. However, that project has not been approved 
yet.  
 
Agriculture characteristics and production conditions. Farmers (A) and 
Crop Production (H1). Besides the group of farmers that are part of the irrigation 
association located downstream the canal, referred to here as “tailenders”, there is another 
group of farmers. These farmers do not participate in formal water governance systems 
and are located upstream along the canal, close to the first 30 km of the canal (J1). These 
farmers, referred to here as “headenders” because of their location upstream along the 
canal (A), arrived from the adjacent Andean region of Cajamarca (especially from Chota 
and Santa Cruz towns) to the basin, beginning in 1984 to work in agro-industrial 
companies, mostly related to the sugar industry.   
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Later on, they saw the opportunity of using water from the canal and decided to 
build their houses and farms upstream along the canal. Most of them are still working for 
sugar companies, but are also farming and trying different crops in these areas. Since the 
settlement of this community was actually spontaneous, improvised and not planned nor 
overseen by the government at its national or regional levels, it has experienced limited 
development and still faces serious problems associated with nutrition, education (I1) and 
access to basic services, such as potable water and electric power (Alfaro, 2008).  
 
At the beginning, these settlers were not able to register their farms or houses 
within the legal system. However, given that the Peruvian Civil Code11 grants “squatters 
rights” for anyone that possesses land for more than 10 years, they are de facto owners of 
that land12 (J3). However, none of these de facto landowners have registered themselves 
in the irrigation water association (B) and thus any water they appropriate is ultimately 
outside the formal structure of rules that governs the activities of members of the 
association.  
 
 
                                                
11 Articles 950 to 953 of the Peruvian Civil Code set the rules for acquisitive prescription  in Peru. 
Acquisitive prescription, also named usucapion (Latin), is a concept found in civil law systems -those used 
in continental Europe, Central and South America, and even the State of Louisiana-, which originated in 
Roman Property Law.  Usucapion is a method by which property can be gained by possession of it beyond 
the lapse of a certain period of time, providing that possession is public, continuous and pacific -meaning 
not formally nor physically disputed-. The real effect of usucapion is to remedy defects in a title, and 
therefore make it certain in order to transit to its most valued use.  Peruvian Law establishes that acquisitive 
prescription of land is obtained after 5 years of possession if a sufficient title to property and good faith are 
proven. If no title exists, Peruvian Law requires a continued, pacific and public possession of the land for 
10 years for courts to apply the remedy.  
 
12 This is called adverse possession.  
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Headenders frequently claim that the rules are organized in such a way that favors 
rich farmers and does not allow for equal opportunities (I) (Alfaro 2008). I did not have 
the opportunity to talk to them about this perception but it may be because governmental 
policies have traditionally been focused on the development of the capital city and its 
surroundings, marginalizing people from the highlands and the jungle. Since upstream 
farmers are originally form the highlands, they may have already the feelings of 
abandonment from the government. Moreover, downstream farmers do not want them to 
use water from the canal, to take away form them their mean for subsistence, knowing 
this background, is probably seen as unfair.     
 
These headender farmers grow mainly maize, which is a relatively low water 
consumptive crop, but because of their small-scale parcels, their crops are produced at a 
high cost and low profits. Tailenders on the other hand tend to grow high water-intensive 
(but also higher-value) crops such as rice (39%), sugar cane (38%), and cotton (7%) 
(H1).  
            Farms sizes (A). Downstream, there are 28,431 farms of a total irrigated 
extension of 118,523 ha2 that belong to 24,335 users. Most of the farms (89.30%) are 
smaller than 10 ha and represents the 53.99% of total irrigated land.  Only 0.18% of 
farms are greater than 100 ha but these represent 17.59% of the total irrigated area.  
 
Legal framework for water use and allocation. The first law (J) and the base of 
the legal framework of water use was issued in 1969 - Law 17752 - “Ley general de 
Aguas” (LGA). It was issued in the context in which the national government centralized 
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the management of all natural resources and at the same time focused its policies in the 
agricultural sector. Thus, the law ascribed the Ministry of Agriculture as the national 
authority of water management, which were supported by local authorities: Irrigation 
District Technical Managers (ATDR).  
Later, in 2010 the law was changed into a new one: Ley de Recursos Hídricos, 
Ley N 29338. This law establishes the following priorities for water allocation (J3): 
1. Primary use (direct withdraws from rivers or canals for consumption or hygiene)  
2. Domestic use 
3. Agricultural use 
4. Fishery Industry use 
5. Other productive sectors13  
 
The law also states that water users association (Irrigation Districts) have the right 
to access, withdraw and to manage water resources in the basin (J1). This last right 
includes the right to construction and maintenance of infrastructure related to water (and 
duties), to distribute water and to designate tariffs (J2). However, the State maintains its 
rights of exclusion and alienation.  
 
Farmers have to register their farm in the water local authority (ALA) so they can 
obtain a license that allows them to use water for agricultural purposes. This license 
allows the farmer to use a maximum amount of water related to their land size (10,423m3 
for 1 ha). The license is valid indefinitely and it is not transferable. However, the law also 
                                                
13 I am combining different sectors into “Other productive sectors” for simplicity, but the law 
states a detailed list of priorities. 
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states that when water is scarce they may have access to less water than indicated in the 
license.  
 
The law also states that if a farmer has been using water for irrigation purposes 
for more than 5 years, even if it was through informal arrangements, they automatically 
gain the right to water14 (J3). Accordingly, some of the current informal farmers have the 
legal right to use water from the basin, but still have to respect others sectors higher 
priority rights and the allocation rules stipulated by water managers, and pay water 
tariffs. Also, they must register their land and pay tariffs, which must be used to improve 
irrigation infrastructure (This is the rule related to the provisioning of public 
infrastructure). Moreover, there are no limits to agriculture land expansion, and any new 
farmer can claim his right to water use.  
 
Although the law establishes the rights and obligations referred to water 
appropriation and public infrastructure provisioning (infrastructure construction and 
maintenance), it does not clarify the administration of how to proceed in the case of non-
compliance of a rule by any agent (J6). Moreover, government agencies do not have the 
power or the resources to effectively enforce water rules and strengthen governance (J6). 
In 1993 the Peruvian Constitution was changed and created regional governments that 
therefore needed to be coordinated with local governments, also called Municipalities. 
Before this period national governance was centralized in the capital and thus economic 
opportunities of growth were created more intensively in Lima and surrounding regions. 
                                                
14 This is called adverse possession.  
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The need to foster regional governance was eminent. However, there was poor transfer of 
knowledge and economic resources for management, especially relating to water. With 
limited economic growth and governmental assistance, the population of the Lambayeque 
region had insufficient capacities for self-management. As a result, water users remained 
in a chaotic situation in which neither the national nor the regional authorities had real 
power to manage water resources. What we see in the region now is powerless local 
government and thus very low incentives to comply with the law.  
 
Tailenders’ rules (J2). There is no evidence of major conflicts among 
Tailenders15. Water appropriation and public infrastructure provisioning rules enables 
coordination among tailenders and they are bound by the following collective action 
rules.  
 
Tailenders’ water appropriation rules. Water appropriation for tailender farmers 
depends on the crop they grow and of the size of their landholding. At a national level 
there is a consensus of irrigation coefficients for each crop and the Irrigation District will 
deliver water considering those coefficients (see table 3) and for the determined month 
too (e.g. rice will receive water only from December to May, each month has its 
coefficient and in the total period the maximum amount per ha is 14,000 m3). However, 
when water is scarce, if the size of the landholding of the farmer is big, he will only 
receive a percentage of what he asked (e.g. if he is declaring that he intends to grow in 20 
ha then the irrigation district will deliver water to his farm considering the needs for 12 
                                                15	  No conflict is mentioned in any report or research in the basin, nor mentioned in interviews 
performed in fieldwork, even when I asked about it. 	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ha only). Because cotton is very sensitive to drought, cotton growers have a priority of 
water when the resource is scarce. Farmers cannot declare an intention to use more land 
of what he really has because he must previously declare his farm size to the water 
national authority and the irrigation district has this information.   
 
Table 3  
Crops and Irrigations Coefficients – 1000m3/Ha (example) 
 
 
Note. From Junta de Regantes Chancay Lambayeque (Irrigation District)  
 
Tailenders public infrastructure provisioning rules. The infrastructure 
maintenance expenses are financed from water tariffs, and when there are particular 
projects requiring investment, from additional voluntary contributions from users or 
subsidized by the government. The required amount of investment depends on annual 
budgets. However, there are no studies that determine real maintenance needs, so this 
budget does not reflect real conditions and thus, annual investment budgets are 
underestimated16 (Regional Presidency, 2010).  
 
Moreover, water tariffs are determined by the irrigation association, which 
represents users. This is based on these annual investment budgets divided by the 
                                                
16 This information was corroborated during fieldwork.  
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estimated volume of water to be delivered. The water volume estimation is based on the 
average used water during the preceding 10 years (according to the tariff of and quota for 
water for irrigation regulation). However, users often lobby so managers estimate this 
water volume considering only the smallest annual value of water use in those 10 years, 
instead of considering the average. Their argument is that the agricultural economic 
conditions are not good and that thus they can’t afford to pay the full water tariff as 
stipulated by regulation. Then, water tariffs are very low (0.024317 S/. per thousands m3) 
and the irrigation association finds itself short on resources to invest in infrastructure.  
 
As a result, because of both 1) they do not know how much they need to invest in 
the infrastructure maintenance to maintain or improve its efficiency, and 2) because they 
do not collect enough money, the irrigation infrastructure is underprovided. As a 
consequence, around 20% of the total water is lost through the canal and reservoir, 
mainly because of infiltration and leakages (Regional Presidency,  2010).  
 
Barriers faced by farmers. From interviews I conducted in the region, tailenders 
farmers identified that the main barriers that the agricultural activity face (E) are (from 
most important to less)18: 
• Access to credit (F). Most farmers face credit constraints because their credit 
risk is very high and banks are willing to lend money only to a very small 
group of farmers and at a very high interest rate. Some farmers invest less 
                                                17	  0.009 USD per thousands m3	  18	  Tailenders answered individually to the open question: “Which are the main barriers that you 
identify for you economic activity?”	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than they know they should, decreasing their land productivity and thus their 
total production and profits. This is a vicious cycle: The next season they face 
the same constraints as before. Some other farmers get credit from rice or 
sugar cane mills, but then they are required to grow either rice or sugar, 
depending on who lent them the money. This creates a vicious cycle because 
those crops are high water intensive crops and are not very profitable, 
especially because they have to sell it to the mill at artificially low prices (E). 
It also affects their willingness to pay higher tariffs, and thus the water 
manager capacity to invest in the infrastructure maintenance.  
 
• Technical assistance. Farmers have very limited technical assistance for 
agriculture practices (e.g. knowledge of how much fertilizer to use, which 
type of seeds, how to drain the fields, crop rotation), irrigation (they don’t 
know the precise amount of water that the crop needs) and for participating in 
the market (some of them have grown more value added crops but then they 
don’t know how to sell it) (I1).  Then, their knowledge limitations affect their 
profit levels, and at the same time another vicious cycle is created: with low 
profits, farmers find it difficult to “self finance” investments in their human 
capital. The presence of water intensive crops intensified by inefficient 
irrigation practices, are also contributing to soil salinization, which is also a 
significant problem in the basin. For example, farmers that are growing rice 
are currently using 20% more water than what rice needs, and rice is one of 
the most important crops in the regions (ANA 2008). Moreover, the use of 
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excessive fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides are contaminating 
groundwater of the basin (Regional Presidency 2010).  
 
• Water deficit (G). Farmers argue that they do not get as much water as they 
need to farm what they plan. This is what they call water shortage and this is 
how I will use from now on this term19. Instead of growing over two full 
seasons farmers grow one full season and one short season because of water 
deficit. Also, when the reservoir holds less water than what it normally does, 
farmers do not get their full water allocation. This also affects their 
productivity and thus their profits (E). In this case there is also a vicious cycle 
in which low profits combined with other factors (including institutions) affect 
water deficit and vice versa. 
 
Water Deficit (G). Table 4 shows biannual water supply20 (H2), demand21, 
deficit and surplus from 2003 to 2011. The water deficit and surplus are calculated on a 
monthly basis and the table shows their biannual amount. We can see that water demand 
is greater than water supply (G). Moreover, because of an inadequate irrigation 
                                                19	  Systems rarely provide a resource to its entire demand. Then, it is not my intention to eradicate 
the phenomenon explained as water deficit. However, this upsets farmers and given that there is a great 
space for improving efficiency in the system and to reduce the gap of water demand and supply, I share 
farmers view and acknowledge it as a problem. The term Water Deficit will be therefore used throughout 
this text to refer to this specific phenomenon, as indicated by the farmers working in the system. 	  
20 Water supply is the calculated amount (with a 75% of probability or persistence) of water 
available in the Chancay River and in the Tinajones Reservoir together. 
21 Non-agricultural demand is estimated as a fixed demand since there is not annual information 
about its accurate value.  Agricultural demand is calculated base upon farmers’ statement on their intention 
to plant each year, plus a roughly estimation of upstream farmers water demand.	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infrastructure that does not fully capture water from the river, the total annual deficit is 
higher than it otherwise would be. Current infrastructure has storage limitations, but it 
also loses water when it is brought through the canal due to evaporation too but mostly 
because of inadequate infrastructure. Moreover, as I will explain later, there are farmers 
that are not registered in the formal system upstream the Taymi canal that are 
withdrawing water without permission and regulation.  
 
Table 4  
Water Demand and Supply at 75% of persistence in the Basin (MCM)  
 
 
Note. From Regional Government (2010) 
 
Conflicts among users (G). Alfaro (2008) reported that there have been violent 
conflicts among headenders (upstream farmers that are illegally pumping water), and 
tailenders (farmers that are part of the formal sector) (G). This was corroborated in field 
research. There are around 1,500 headenders located along the canal and the amount that 
they are withdrawing, while difficult to quantify, is (anecdotally and based upon the 
implicit water needs of the acreage under headender tillage) considerable. However, they 
20003-
20004
2004-
2005
2005-
2006
2006-
2007
2007-
2008
2008-
2009
2009-
2010
2010-
2011
Chancay River 511.63 508.91 701.77 702.20 706.80 708.53 708.53 623.59
Recovered Water 50.00 25.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
Groundwater 80.00 150.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00
Total Supply 641.60 683.91 821.77 822.20 826.80 828.53 828.53 743.59
Agricultural 
Demand 874.57 1086.87 751.80 901.16 1006.29 980.88 945.45 803.72
Non-agricultural 
Demand 68.56 68.56 68.56 68.56 68.56 68.56 68.56 68.56
Total Demand 942.92 1155.42 820.36 969.72 1074.85 1049.44 1014.01 872.28
Deficit -306.50 -471.52 -124.21 -225.44 -277.19 -326.34 -251.63 -199.41
Surplus 5.21 0.00 125.62 77.92 29.14 105.44 66.15 70.72
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have not been paying tariffs. During fieldwork, I talked to a headender that mentioned 
that some of them have started paying but there is not record of such payments, and when 
they show receipts they are not from the Irrigation Association. The local water authority 
confirmed this fact, but they cannot ensure what is happening: Are headenders falsifying 
those receipts? Is the irrigation association giving different receipts? Is someone else 
illegally charging a water tariff anonymously? etc.  These questions remain unanswered, 
but for farmers and for the national authorities, this is one of the main concerns in regard 
to water management.  
 
 
Figure 8. Headednders' Pumps in the Taymi Canal 
 
 
Given the insufficiency of government’s capacity to enforce water appropriation 
and public infrastructure provisioning rules, one would hope to see collective action 
among users but this is not happening. Headenders and tailenders have different 
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approaches of fairness in regard to current water management and rules (I2). Headenders 
claim that the rules are organized in such a way that favors rich farmers and forbids equal 
opportunities (Alfaro, 2008) (I2). Thus they do not pay water tariffs and are pumping 
without any restriction and legal authorization from the canal (see figure 8). Tailenders 
believe that what is unfair is that they are the only group that pays for water and that gets 
constraints in their water use. Some of them would even prefer to avoid extending 
membership to the headenders since that would imply to recognize their right to 
appropriate water, and they fear that it could be translated in higher appropriation levels 
from headenders (I2).   
 
Water use and delivery inefficiency (G). Water has not been used efficiently, 
the total efficiency of water use in the basin is 36.55% while a minimum of 50% of 
efficiency is required for an acceptable performance (ANA, 2008), and this is affecting 
water availability and short-term and long-term production. The types of efficiency loss 
explored in this section are the following. First, farmers are growing water intensive 
crops at minimum profits. In the region there are many sugar and rice mills that give 
credit to farmers so they can grow rice and sugar. Without personal savings for 
investment or access to other type of credit, farmers choose to grow sugar or rice.  
 
Second, farmers’ irrigation techniques are very inefficient (they use gravity 
irrigation and irrigate with more water than what the crop needs (ANA, 2008)). Third, 
farmers’ agricultural practices are also inefficient which affects the water demand of 
crops. This poor management capacity leads to soil degradation, salinization, low quality 
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crops and low productivity. Obviously, this decreases their revenues, increases their costs 
and makes it difficult to increase water tariffs to better fund infrastructure development 
and maintenance. All these factors lead to inadequate maintenance of water 
infrastructure, which is the fourth cause of inefficiency. The fifth cause is the failure to 
formalize upstream farmers that are using water without legal authorization or regulation. 
All these efficiencies affect the sustainability of the water resource and the sustainable 
development of the region.   
The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework  
Figures 9 and 10 show identified variables of the of the Chancay-Lambayeque 
system when using the IAD framework. Figure 9 shows the Action Situation as it 
explains the internal variables that affect farmers’ actions; and Figure 10, shows the 
identified external variables that affect the incentive structure of the system. 
Figure 9. The Chancay - Lambayeque Action Situation 
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Figure 10. The External Variables the Affect the Action Situation 
 
H. Biophysical Conditions I. Attributes of Community J. Rules in Use
H1. Crops Grown: Headenders 
grow mainly maize and tailenders 
grow mainly rice, sugar cane and 
cotton (in that order)
J1. Position Rules: Two types of farmers. 1) 
Headenders: Informal users, located upstream the 
canal, mainly maize growers. 2) Tailenders: Formal 
users, located downstream the canal, mainly 
growers of high water intensive crops as rice, sugar 
and cotton. There are by far more tailenders than 
headenders (aprox. 2800 vs. 1500)
H2. Water Supply and Capacity 
of the Canal: 
Water Supply of the basin is 
around 186 MMC 
The Capacity of the canal is: 65 
m3/s in the initial part (Until 
Partidor Desaguadero) and of 25 
m3/s  from Partidor Cachinche.  
H3. Topography: Semi-arid 
region located on the north west 
of Peru
I2. Notions of equity: Tailenders feel 
that it is unfair that they have to pay 
for all the system and headenders do 
not pay for it, and also that they have 
constrained water demands and 
headenders do not. On the other hand, 
there is huge sense of resentment from 
headenders. They believe that rules are 
unfair, that they are done for rich 
people.
J3. Choice Rules: Headenders have the legal right 
of appropriation because they have being using that 
water for more than 20 years (adverse possession: 
the law states that if they have been using water 
from a system for more than 5 years, then they 
acquire water rights of that system); however, they 
have to pay a tariff and comply with regulations. 
Tailenders may take water that is allocated and must 
not take more water than that. Each year, the 
government allocates a certain amount of water to 
farmers. The law stipulates that water should go first 
for (in this order): A. Primary use (direct withdraws 
from rivers or canals for consumption or hygiene), 
B. Domestic use, C. Agricultural use, D: Fishery 
Industry use, E: Other productive sectors.  
H4. Engineering works: 
Tinajones Reservoir, Taymi Canal 
(Main ones)
J4. Scope Rules:  for tailenders who are managers, 
there is a maximum amount of water that they can 
bring to the gate. Every season, tailenders are 
assigned a maximum amount of water. Headenders 
are not monitored, the law says that they must 
register, pay for water and comply with their 
allocation; but in reality no one controls them.  
J5. Information Rules: Tailenders have to specify 
at the beginning of a farming season, the type of 
crops and size of the land that they intend to farm. 
Managers will later tell them how much water is 
available to bring to the gate and how much water 
they can allocate to them. Headenders should have 
the same practice, but in reality they do not 
participate in this information process. 
J6. Payoff Rules: There is no sanction for 
headenders. For tailenders, if they do not pay water 
tariff managers will not deliver water to their gates. 
Managers hire people to control water delivery for 
each tailender. There is not a clear punishment for 
farmers (tailenders) that appropriate more water 
than their allotment. 
J7. Aggregation Rules: tailenders elect managers
J2. Boundary Rules: Water use is subject to 
ownership or leasing of land for farming and subject 
to a tariff (headenders do not comply with this rule)
I1. Level of education: The Land 
reform was performed with out any 
capacity building or any type of 
training, thus tailenders' knowledge of 
agricultural practices is limited.  
Headenders’ knowledge is limited too 
because they come from the highlands, 
which is a different region where 
levels of education are even lower. 
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Options to Explore with the Theoretic Game Model 
Although I identify many other problems over the sustainability of water 
management in the basin, I focus the rest of this study in the main causes of conflict 
between headenders and tailenders related to the water appropriation and common 
irrigation infrastructure provision in the basin, and on how this may affect them 
individually and collectively. In this sense, it is clear that the key concerns are the 
efficiency of water resource allocation and use. Thus, I explore the possibilities of 
addressing efficiency concerns via modeling. 
 
One important finding is that the presence of the government has not been 
effective because of the limited resources assigned to water management in the basin and 
because of a loss of authority. Full public governance may require higher rates of 
investment from the government; then one solution may be to provide users the 
conditions that may facilitate collaboration among them and thus to increase the 
efficiency of water resource allocation and use. Providing these conditions may imply: 
 
1. Property rights. An important part of the law reform should be focused in the 
proper definition of property rights. Property Rights Theory says that a condition 
to ensure the preservation of a common pool resource (CPR) is to have well-
defined territories. CPRs can be a governmental property (by a national, regional 
or local government); privately owned (by individuals or corporations) or owned 
by communal groups. If no one (or everyone) owns CPRs, they are called open 
access resources and will probably be depleted or cause conflicts. To ensure the 
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sustainability of a CPR, it is necessary to have well-defined property rights, which 
are not limited to one solution or arrangement.  
 
A more careful design is needed for the Chancay – Lambayeque basin. 
Given strong evidences from literature of CPRs management that recommends 
focusing on property rights (Schlager and Ostrom 1992, Libecap 1989, North 
1978, De Alessi 1980, Libecap 1986, and Ostrom 1990), in the next section I will 
analyze how changing property rights may change outcomes. In the Basin, 
because water is owned by the state, farmers have the right to manage it and 
exclude collectively, but not of alienation. However, no one has the real power to 
enforce rules, thus the system is acting almost as an open access resource or as if 
there are not defined property rights. The consequences are that farmers that are 
upstream fulfill their water needs while farmers downstream the canal do not, and 
at the same time upstream farmers avoid paying tariffs. This leads to water 
farmers downstream the canal to face water scarcity and to a underinvestment in 
the infrastructure maintenance of the canal (this will be carefully analyzed in 
chapter 8 through the model) 
 
2. Economic performance and pricing. The performance of the agricultural 
activity relies on water availability, and water availability relies in the economic 
performance. Because the tariff that farmers pay, when they do not default, is very 
low it affects not only the willingness to conserve water, but also the total money 
collected to invest in water quality improvement, infrastructure maintenance, law 
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enforcement (e.g. to control water withdrawals of informal farmers), and other 
complementary activities. However, at the same time, farmers in the region argue 
that they are not making enough profits to pay a higher rate for water and to force 
them to pay higher prices could be politically unviable. If this is true, an 
integrated plan of management that progressively increases water tariffs 
according to a certain schedule could be ideal for this case. In that schedule, the 
government could invest in infrastructure maintenance, capacity building, 
targeting that farmers have notions of better agricultural practices as noted before. 
Also, because this is a policy recommended by previous reports (Regional 
Presidency 2010), In chapter 8, using the game theoretic model, I analyze how 
increases in water tariffs affect the incentive structure for the water appropriation 
and infrastructure provision dilemma, and how this may affect farmers’ actions 
and outcomes.  
 
3. Agricultural and entrepreneurial knowledge: There are different crops that 
have higher value in the market than rice, corn or sugar, and that farmers could 
make better profits selling them, as has been proposed by many experts 
(MINCETUR 2004, Herrera and Caferata 2009). The region have good weather 
conditions to grow fruits and vegetables that are less water intensive, more 
profitable and that would help to prevent more soil salinization. For this, the 
government could use external resources (which are currently available from 
different sources, as the World Bank, The European Union Cooperation with 
Andean countries to help to improve agricultural yields and exports, etc.). Some 
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farmers are already switching to fruit and vegetables, however, because they do 
not know how to grow these crops or they have insufficient capacities to sell 
them, they end up losing money and going back to the traditional crops.  
 
Also, farmers or the government could invest in the acquisition of 
knowledge to improve farmers’ agricultural practices. Their use of agrochemicals, 
water, and other inputs is not based on technical advice but more on practical 
knowledge and many times merely on intuition. This investment in knowledge 
could also be in regard to entrepreneurial knowledge. Farmers ultimately are 
small firm holders and they need to improve their knowledge about finance, 
productivity and resource saving practices. This is very important in order to 
ensure that in the long run, farmers are able to manage their farms efficiently and 
are capable of making profits and thus paying higher rates for the infrastructure 
maintenance and also to stop facing financial constraints that leave them with no 
option but to grow only one crop.  
 
While these suggestions, could clearly improve farmers’ income or 
farming performance it may result in the long run in even more water demand. 
Then, in chapter 8, I explore with the model the potential consequences of 
policies of actions in the direction of these suggestions, in terms of the water 
appropriation problem and infrastructure provision.  
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In the next chapter, I set up the game theoretic model to then use it in chapters 7 
and 8. In chapter 8, I use the model to analyze how variables of the IAD framework 
determine the incentive structure that affect farmers behaviors in terms of water 
appropriation and infrastructure provision decisions, and in chapter 8 to explore these 
three solution options mentioned above.   
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Chapter 6 
THE APPROPRIATION – PROVISION MODEL 
Introduction to the model  
To be able to model the system’s dynamics and incentive structure, I focus on 
only a few aspects of the system. These aspects are key factors for explaining the 
appropriation (water use) and provision dilemma (related to the irrigation infrastructure 
maintenance). My aim is to simplify the system to be able to represent it in a model that 
is useful to understand what the main factors that affect farmers’ behavior are, and how 
these factors influence their decisions with regards to the appropriation and provision 
dilemmas. With this purpose, I make necessary assumptions meant first to understand the 
system as a set of parts, and then to understand its dynamics.  
 
 The model I use in this research is an adaptation of one suggested by Lee (1994) for 
irrigation systems. Many analyses of upstream – downstream farmers sharing a basin 
have been done (e.g. Burness & Quirk (1979); (1980); Madani (2009)). However the 
application of this model is distinct because I consider the appropriation and the 
provision problem as linked together, with the latter conditioning behavior in the former, 
in a dynamic game context, rather than taking the more common approach of considering 
each of these games separately (Lee, 1994).  The resolution of the provision dilemma 
affects water availability for everyone, and thus it also affects water appropriation. At the 
same time, the parameters and anticipated outcomes of behaviors in the appropriation 
game will affect users’ decisions with regard to infrastructure maintenance.  
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Understanding the model and its assumptions  
 A formal game is one method of analyzing an action situation and its interactions 
with the three external variables: Physical Attributes, Rules, and Community Attributes 
(Ostrom, et al. 1994). I conceptualize the incentive structure as an action situation that is 
represented by parameters and variables. The two main variables of the model will be 
representing possible actions, or farmers’ behavior: (1) amount of water appropriated 
(!!", where i indicates the number of the player =1,2; and t is the time period = 1,2); and 
(2) amount of investment in the infrastructure maintenance (!!,). 
 
 I represent the two groups of farmers (headenders and tailenders) as 2 players. 
Player 1 (!!) is the headender and Player 2 (!!) is the tailender. By combining both types 
of farmers in just two players I am assuming, for simplicity, that there is no asymmetry 
within each group, but the characteristics of headenders and tailenders are different in 
terms of their location with respect to the canal, the crops that they grow, the type of 
technology that they use to appropriate and irrigate water and in general their agricultural 
practices.  
 
 In this model I represent tailenders as the most vulnerable group to water scarcity 
because they have a de facto junior right. However, this is not the case in the Chancay-
Lambayeque basin since tailenders are the main users and have a privileged position: 
they are the water managers and they have control over how much water is brought to the 
system (canal). Nevertheless they are subject to unregulated use and appropriation by 
headenders, and for simplicity and to better understand only the appropriation and 
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provision decisions and analyze them in isolation, I will neglect the control that tailenders 
have over the amount of water that is brought in to the system.  
 
 For this model I assume that players have complete and perfect information. 
Complete information implies that they know each other’s payoffs, possible outcomes, 
strategies, etc., and perfect information implies that they also know other players’ actions 
(Gibbons, 1997).  I am also defining the game as a finite game of only 2 periods, which 
allow us to understand the linkage between provision and appropriation without the 
additional complexity of viewing these decisions in a repeated interactions framework.  
 
Until now I have described action situation parameters and variables. In the next 
section, I will show how with game theory models we can see the relationship between 
these action situation parameters and variables, and the parameters that represent the key 
external variables of the IAD framework: physical attributes, rule configurations, and 
attributes of the community.  
 
Payoff Structure. I explain first benefit and cost characteristics and then I explain how 
these internal and external components of the IAD framework interact.  
 
§ Benefits. Water use (!!) is translated into crop production through a production function. 
I assume that other production decisions (such as amount of fertilizer) are optimized 
according to the choice of water use, and crop choice remains constant over the horizon 
of the game. This production function describes the relationship between different units 
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of water used for irrigation purposes and crop production. Lets assume the following 
production function: !! = !!!! − 0.5!!!!!    
Where !! is the units of crops produced (output) by player i and di and gi are defined as:  !! = !!!! ,!! = !!!! ; 
qi is the monetary value of the additional output generated by the first unit of irrigation 
water; ri determines how the marginal value changes in monetary values as the amount of 
appropriated water changes, and pi is crop price22.   
 
With the production function !! we can find the marginal product23 of !! (!"!!): !"!! = !! − !!!! 
If we multiply !"!!   by pi, then we get the Marginal Benefit of water (MBi). The MBi is 
also farmers’ water demand (see Figure	   11.	   Water	   Marginal	   Benefit1) because it 
indicates farmers’ value of water at any additional unit. !!! = !! − !!!! 
 
I assume in this model that: !! < !!   and !! > !!.  
 
                                                
22 Every unit of used water contributes differently in terms of production and thus of monetary 
value (because the price fixed). The first unit of water contributes more than the second, and the second 
more than the third, and so on. This reduction of value with increasing use is called diminishing returns.  
 23 The marginal product of a resource is the extra output that can be produced by using one more 
unit of the input, and can be derived by taking the derivative of the production function with respect to that 
input (in this case !!") 
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            !! < !! because player 2 has more knowledge about farming activities, and has 
more resources. Tailenders are bigger farmers and because they are in the formal sector 
they have better access to credit and knowledge.  Also, this relationship is maintained 
because rice and sugar have higher prices in the market than maize. Then, since !! is the 
monetary value of the additional output generated by the first unit of irrigation water, 
player 2 can get a greater outcome for the first unit of water that he uses.  
 
          !! > !! holds because rice and sugar (which are the main crops produced by 
tailenders) are more water intensive crops than maize (the main crop produced by 
headenders). This happens because the next unit of water appropriated for a crop will 
contribute to production more if it is a crop that needs more water than other (because 
crops that do not need too much water fulfill they water demand with less amount of 
water). Then, because ri determines how the marginal value changes as the amount of 
appropriated water changes, higher r implies higher changes which means less 
contribution from the next unit of water appropriated to production, which means less 
water intensive crop. This relationship also holds because there are more farmers 
downstream the canal (bigger player 2) than upstream the canal.24 Figure	  11.	  Water	  Marginal	  Benefit1 shows how the tailenders’ MB2 curve is less steep than headenders’ 
MB1 curve because !! > !!. 
                                                
24 If we consider player 1 and player 2 as an aggregation of all headenders and all tailenders 
respectively we would have to add their water demands by summing water quantities at a given “price” 
(MB), an “horizontal summation”. The more demands that we add less steep the aggregate demand curve is 
(i.e. the smaller r becomes)	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Figure 11. Water Marginal Benefit 
 
 To calculate the total benefit (TB) of water use we just need to multiply the 
production function by the crop price. Then we get: !!! = !"! = !!! − 0.5!!!! 
 The intuition behind these equations is that when players’ water use is low, 
increases in water appropriation (!!) will substantially increase players’ crop production. 
As players’ water appropriation gets higher, the effect of an increase of !!on X! will be 
smaller. In other words, !! has diminishing returns. Moreover, !!will not always 
contribute positively to crop production. Crops can only get a maximum amount of water, 
after that maximum amount, every increase of !! will reduce the total crop production 
and thus, its total benefit (see Figure 11. Water Marginal Benefit2) 
 
§ Costs. There is a cost associated with water appropriation. For headenders, for example, 
this can be the electricity cost to pump water from the canal, and for tailenders water 
tariffs. For simplicity, I assume that the cost is the appropriated water, times a constant 
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rate ci  (!!!!). Also, there is a cost related to the infrastructure maintenance !!. As I will 
represent later, the infrastructure maintenance will affect payoffs of the period that follow 
the period of investment. Since this will be a two period game, each farmer may invest in 
period 1 to affect their payoffs in period 2. In the last period, neither of them will invest !!, because there is no subsequent period in which they will use water for agriculture. 
Thus, farmers will potentially invest only in period 1. 
 
The total cost (!) in each period is thus: !!! = !! !!! = !!!! 
§ Net Benefits. Benefits minus (net of) costs yield players’ Net benefits (Π!) Π!! = −!!! Π!! = !!! − !!! = !!!! − 0.5!!!!! − !!! 
  
 The net benefit (Π!!(!")) curve is concave with respect to !!. This means that 
when !! is low, appropriating more water will increase players’ net benefit. This will 
happen until players reach the optimal amount of water appropriated. After that amount, 
appropriating more water would cause net benefits to decrease. This is the individually 
optimal !! because it is the level that maximizes a farmer’s net benefits, although it may 
not be optimal for the system (see Figure 12). Notice that with positive marginal costs of 
appropriation, individually optimal appropriation always occurs at a lower level of 
extraction than the level that maximizes total benefits (where marginal benefits (MB) 
equal zero). The shape and characteristics of the net benefits curve is mainly determined 
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by q, r and c, which as I explained earlier are some of the external variables of the IAD 
framework that determine the payoffs tracing to particular actions and, therefore the 
incentive structure.  
Figure 12. Total Benefit (TB), Cost (TC), Net Benefit (NB), and Marginal Benefit (MB), 
Cost (MC) and Net Benefits (MNB) Curves 
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Parameters meaning and Implications in the model 
 
• Monetary value of the additional output generated by the first unit of irrigated 
water (q) and in marginal value (r): q and r convey information about farmers’ 
production function, specifically about water productivity and crop prices. As I 
am presenting it in this case, it compiles every other factor that affects water 
productivity, such as soil quality, agricultural practices, salinization, type of crop 
etc. Thus, if we would like to analyze some physical attribute to incentivize 
farmers’ behavior in a certain direction, we can analyze it through these 
parameters.  
 
 Also, if actors would like to invest in or to increase their knowledge to 
improve their agricultural practices, it could be also analyzed through q and r. As 
we can see in figure 13, increases in q shifts the marginal benefit curve to the 
right with the effect of shifting the total benefit curve upward and moving its peak 
to the right. This implies that same amount of water appropriation will lead, with 
a higher !, to higher benefits. 
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Figure 13. Shift in Net Benefit and in Marginal Net Benefit from changes in q 
 
 As we can see in figure 14, changes in r will change the slope of the NMB curve. 
If r increases, as for a change in crop production, then the marginal benefit will be less 
than before and thus for any additional appropriated water the net benefit will be 
increasingly smaller than if r were lower. 
 
• Changes in marginal cost (c): c can be interpreted as a rule if it represents water 
tariffs. This helps us to analyze what would happen if water tariffs were raised, or 
it can be interpreted as an economic parameter if it represents a cost associated 
with water appropriation (e.g. energy cost for pumping water). As we can see in 
Figure 15, in this case increases in water costs would cause a small reduction in !!, but a significant benefits reduction. 
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Figure 14. Shifts in Net Benefit and Marginal Net Benefit from changes in r 
 	  Note	  that	  we	  are	  assuming	  that	  the	  fixed	  costs	  of	  provision	  (mi)	  are	  held	  constant	  here;	  while	  changes	  in	  these	  costs	  affect	  the	  overall	  level	  of	  realized	  benefits,	  they	  do	  not	  shift	  the	  MB/MC	  curves	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  affect	  appropriation	  decisions.	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Figure 15. Shifts in Total Benefit from changes in  
 
 Also, the payoff structure is also affected by are other physical variables (as water 
availability and water delivery efficiency), and that constrain farmers’ behavior (!! and !!).  
Constraints. The lower limit of both control variables (!!  and !!) is zero.  0 ≤ !! , 0 ≤ !! 
The upper limit of !!   is the amount of water that player i receives in its field gate !!!" , 
since players cannot appropriate more water than what it is available to them (see Figure 
16). Then for headenders:  
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!! ≤ !!!"  
 !!!"  depends on: how much water is at the source of the canal (!!), how much 
water is lost in the canal !!! , irrigation infrastructure characteristics as water delivery 
efficiency (E2) and the length of the canal  !; and for tailenders it will also depend on how 
much water headenders appropriate (u1). All these factors that delimit farmers’ actions 
(except !!), are considered in the IAD framework as physical attributes that affect the 
action situation. I define the relationship between !!  !"#  !!!!"  and all these other 
variables as follows: 
For player 1: !!!" = !! − !!!  
For player 2:  !!!" = !! − !! − !!!  
The amount of water that is lost in the canal !!! : 
For player 1: !!! = !!!  (1− !!)!! 
For player 2: !!! = !!! 1− !! (!! + !!) 
Where ! is the proportion of !!that is lost in a kilometer at zero efficiency (!! = 0), then  !!! is the amount of water lost in one kilometer, !!and !!+ !! are the length (kilometers) 
of the canal to reach !!and !!’s field gate respectively, and !! is the water delivery 
efficiency in period 2 after proportional losses due to evaporation and percolation. 
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Figure 16. Water Flow Diagram 
 
Then we can rewrite the amount of water that player i receives in its field gate !!!": 
For player 1: !!!" = !! − !!! = !! − !!!(1− !!)!! 
For player 2:  !!!" = !! − !!! = !! − !! − !!!(1− !!)(!! + !!) 
Then, we can rewrite the upper limit of !!" as: 
For player 1: !! ≤ !! − !!!  (1− !!)!! 
For player 2: !! ≤ !! − !! − !  !!(1− !!)(!! + !!) 
Figure 17 shows how player 1’s decision on water appropriation affects player 2’s water 
availability 
 
!"
#"
$
"#
"%
"
!"
#$
%&
%' (
%
)"
#$
%&
%' )
%
*+,-.%+,%,/-%012.3-%4567%
8'+9-.%(%%
+::.1:.;+,-6%%
*+,-.%%%42(7%
8'+9-.%)%
+::.1:.;+,-6%%
<+,-.%42)7%
*+,-.%%
=166%
>+56%4%(>?)%7%'(%
5@A(%
*+,-.%%
=166%>+56%4%(>?)%7%')%
5@A)%
>%+56%4%(>?)%7%4'(B')7>%%2(%
 60 
 
Figure 17. Water at The Field Gate as a Function of Efficiency and Player 1's 
Withdrawals 
 
Water delivery efficiency. Players can change indirectly the level of the water 
delivery efficiency in (!!) by investing in the infrastructure maintenance in period 1. 
Then,  !! will depend on the total amount invested in infrastructure maintenance in period 
1 !! through the following “transformation function” (Ostrom, 2005) 
!! = !! + ! !!!!!!! !! 1− !! −   !!! 
  
 The intuition for this equation can be built up from first principles.  First the 
infrastructure has a natural depreciation that for simplicity I will consider constant and 
exogenous to the model. This means that without any investment in its maintenance, the 
irrigation infrastructure loses !100% of efficiency in the next period (t+1): !2− !1!1 = −  ! 
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However, if farmers invest in the infrastructure maintenance, then in the next 
period (t+1) the water delivery efficiency will improve in percentage terms according to 
this transformation function: !2− !1!1 = ! !!!!!!! 1− !1  
Where ! !!!!!!!   expresses diminishing returns of investment, which means that 
the first unit of investment will contribute more to the efficiency improvement than the 
second unit of investment, and so on. (1-!!) is the sensitivity of efficiency improvement. 
The logic of this function relies on the fact that the contribution of the investment in 
maintenance to the efficiency improvement in the next period depends on the current 
level of efficiency: in the extreme case, if the system has already reached 100% of 
efficiency (E1=1), no matter how much farmers invest, it cannot be improved, then the 
effect of investment will be zero. On the other hand, when efficiency is low, investment 
in infrastructure maintenance will have its maximum impact.  
 
Combining both the depreciation and investment effects we have: 
!2 = !1+ ! !!!!!!! !1 1− !1 −   !"1, !"#    !1+!2 > 0 
 Note that since E is a percentage of performance it can only go from 0 to 1. Also 
note that if m goes to 0 then E2 will become: !2 = !1−   !"1 
because there is no effect of m in E2. The relationship between E and m can be observed 
in Figure 18.  
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Figure 18. Water Delivery Efficiency as a Function of m  
 
Notice that when the investment is too low its effect on efficiency is not enough 
to compensate for the depreciation rate and thus water delivery efficiency will still 
decline. The next level of investment will generate improvement in the efficiency level at 
an increasing rate because when efficiency is low small investment will go to leakages 
that affect the system the most. As the efficiency level increases it will be more difficult 
(or solutions will require more technology) to be able to improve it, then it will require 
every time a higher level of investment to see an efficiency improvement.  
 
Game rules: The game will be played in two periods, and given players’ location, in the 
following sequence (see figure 19): 
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1. Player one and player two simultaneously choose how much to invest in 
maintenance !!  and !! 25. This could happen when farmers are 
deciding if they will pay a water tariff or not (that will be invested later in 
infrastructure maintenance), or when water management ask for additional 
contributions specifically for irrigation infrastructure construction or 
maintenance. Both players will decide the amount of investment pursuing 
their aim of appropriating water in the future (next stage). We 
conceptualize this as a simultaneous move because neither player at this 
stage observes how much the other player is contributing.  
 
 At time two (! = 2) 
Given a certain level of water at the source (!!) and Efficiency from investment in t=1 
(E2(m)): 
1. Player one chooses how much to appropriate (!!). Because player 1 is 
upstream, he acts first. His decision in regard to water appropriation does 
not affect him in the future, but will affect player 2.    
2. Knowing !!,  player 2 chooses how much to appropriate (!!). Because 
player 2 is downstream , he will be the last player to make a move in 
regard to water appropriation. His appropriation decision does not affect 
player 1.  
                                                
 25 Note that in this time period players could also choose their level of water appropriation. 
However, this decision is separable from the investment decision and will also not affect farmers’ 
payoffs in the future. Thus, it is not connected with the rest of the game and for this reason I will not 
consider it.  
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 Figure 19 shows how by a given a level of efficiency E1 in the first period, players 
will simultaneously decide how much they will contribute to the infrastructure 
maintenance. The combined amount of investment infrastructure (m) will affect the level 
of efficiency in the second period  (E2), which at the same time will affect water 
availability for both players. Because of their location with respect to the canal, player 1 
will decide how much water he will appropriate to maximize his payoffs, which will affect 
player 2’s water availability. Finally, player 2 will decide how much water he will 
appropriate to maximize his payoffs.   
Figure 19. Game Flowchart 
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Strategies. Each player will try to maximize his own net benefit from the 
irrigation system given the other player’s strategies in period 1 and period 2. Since they 
have complete information in time 1 they know their payoffs under all possible scenarios 
in t=2. Then, they will maximize the sum of their net benefits over the two time periods. 
Because we tend to value present outcomes more than future outcomes, the second period 
total benefit will be discounted by the parameter ! such as, 0< ! < !. ! indicates the 
degree to which future payoffs are valued relative to the value placed on present payoffs 
– the “discount factor”.  
  Then, we can define the present value of net benefits of the game as: !! = Π!! + !Π!! 
  Players maximize the present value of net benefits because present choices not 
only determine present outcomes, but can also influence future payoff structures. 
Replacing Π!! we can rewrite   !!   as  !! = !Π!! −!!   
  Both players will simultaneously decide in the first period the amount that they 
are willing to invest in maintenance of the infrastructure (!!) and for the second period 
of analysis how much water to appropriate (!!). Notice that the decision of how much 
water to appropriate in period 2 can be affected, due to the change in availability of water 
due to efficiency improvements, by the total investment in period 1.  These (!!   !"#  !!) 
are the two control variables of the model, which means that are the two variables that 
farmers get to choose. Then, each player will choose the amount of water to appropriate !!   and the investment amount !! that will maximize their discounted payoffs to a present 
value !!.  
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Model Summary  
For every variable that presents this notation !!", it means:  !:  !"#$%&  (! = 1,!"#$%&  1;   ! = 2,!"#$%&  2)  !   = !"#$  (1,2)  
Parameters and variables != total amount invested in maintenance   !!= amount that player i invests in maintenance  in time 1 !!=water appropriated by player i in time 2 Π!"= player i’s benefits in time t !!= parameter giving the monetary value of the additional output generated by the first 
unit of irrigation water !!=  parameter that determines how the marginal value changes as the amount of 
appropriated water changes !!= marginal cost of water appropriation != discount factor (less than 1, greater than 0) !!= length of the canal for player i !!= Water at the source !!!"  = water at the field gate for player i != coefficient of water loss !! = water delivery efficiency at time t 
Θ= depreciation 
 
 67 
Equations 
Payoffs: 
 
 Π!! = −!!  (1) 
 
 Π!! = !!!! − 0.5!!!!! − !!!! (2) 
 
 ψ!! = !Π!! −!!  (3) 
Water Delivery  
 !!!" = !! − !!!(1− !!)!!  (4) 
 
 !!!" = !! − !! − !!!(1− !!)(!! + !!) (5) 
Water Delivery Efficiency 
If ! > 0 !! = !! + ! !!(!!!!!)(!!)(1− !!)   −   !!!  (6) 
If ! = 0 !! = !!   −   !!!  (7) 
 
Conditions / constraints: 
 0 ≤ !! ≤ !! − !  !!(1− !!)!!  (8) 
 0 ≤ !! ≤ !! − !! − !!!  (1− !!)(!! + !!)  (9) 
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For the sake of ease of interpretation, I propose some initial conditions and values 
for the parameters that are in keeping with broad realities in the Chancay-Lambayeque 
system.  However, the purpose of this parameterization is not to provide precise 
numerical predictions for management (an unrealistic objective for a stylized game model 
such as this), but rather to generate a baseline for understanding the qualitative properties 
of the system under status-quo and counterfactual scenarios. I propose some initial 
conditions and values to the parameters. For those values that are unknown in the 
Chancay-Lambayeque System I will use those values used in Lee (1997). Later I will 
perform a sensitivity analysis.  See Appendix C for calibration details.  
 
Table 5  
Values of the parameters 
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Chapter 7 
GAME OUTCOMES 
The investments in irrigation efficiency in the first period of the game have the 
potential to affect payoffs, and therefore the best choice of strategies for water 
appropriation, in the second stage of the game. When making their investments, players 
find it in their interest to consider the likely outcome of the appropriation game for each 
level of water supply (Qs) and efficiency level (E1) and project those outcomes forward in 
their decision of how much to invest in efficiency.  
 
Optimal actions are defined as the actions that maximize players’ individual 
payoffs after considering possible outcomes, such that given the strategy of all other 
players, no player has an incentive to individually change his action. A solution to this 
game consists of a full menu of possible responses (i.e. strategies) for every contingency 
in the first and second stages – not just the outcomes that are actually reached in the 
current situation of the basin.  One common solution concept in non-cooperative game 
theory is that of Nash equilibrium (NE).  Under NE, the strategies of each player must be 
a best response to the strategies of the other player so that neither player has an incentive 
to deviate on their own, given the menu of strategies of the other player. 
 
In multi-stage games such as this one, there may be many potential NE. However, 
the sequencing of decisions in the game makes it such that not every menu of strategies 
that yields a NE from the perspective of the game as a whole is actually credible, in the 
sense that a player would find it in their own best interest to follow through with the 
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prescribed strategy when they come to that point of the game.  Specifically, in the 
appropriation stage of the game it is possible to envision Nash equilibria wherein player 1 
(the headender) promises to exercise restraint, withdrawing less than their optimal 
allocation.  However, in the absence of an external enforcer or context in which player 2 
can punish player 1 for over-appropriation, such a promise will not be credible at the 
point in time when player 1 actually appropriates water. In order to enforce credibility of 
strategies in NE, we draw on the stronger equilibrium concept of subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium (SPNE) (Gintis, 2009).  SPNE requires that the strategy at each decision 
point in the game be a Nash equilibrium, not only from the perspective of the game as a 
whole, but from that point in the game forward.  In our context this requires that the 
appropriation strategies used to predict behavior in the first stage (investment) game 
actually be a NE of the appropriation game. This also allows us to understand the game in 
a sequential fashion from the end back (a process known as backward induction); we first 
find the NE of the appropriation game for all possible plays of the second stage game and 
then roll this information back into our solution for the investment game.   
 
Nash equilibria identified in the second stage are treated as given to identify 
players’ optimal choice in the first period. In the first stage the decision is about the 
infrastructure investment. In this case players do not act in a sequential way but rather in 
a simultaneous manner. This implies that there is no leader in the decision making 
process, contrasting with the appropriation game in which player 1 has to decide the 
amount of appropriation first. When solving the game I find different scenarios that 
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described different NEs so in chapter 8 I can explore the implications of particular 
solution options of the current appropriation – provision problem.  
Second Stage: The Appropriation Dilemma 
  The first move of the second period is from player 1 in regard to his water 
appropriation. He will try to maximize his payoffs in period 2: 
Replacing max!! [ Π! ] by Equation (2): = max!! !!!! − 0.5!!!!! − !!!!  
 Then we have the first order condition of maximization: 
!!!!!! = !! − !!!! − !! = 0 => !!∗   =   (!!   −   !!)/!! 
However this will only happen if there is enough water in t=2 for player 1 to 
appropriate !!"∗  
Then: !!"∗   =   (!!   −   !!)/!!,     if     (!!   −   !!)/!! ≤ !!!" = !! − !!!(1− !!)!!  
If this condition is not fulfilled, e.g., if     !!  !  !!!! > !!!" = !! − !!! 1− !! !! , Player 1 
will only be able to appropriate the amount of water that is at his gate:   
Combining these expressions, the strategy for u1 is: 
Where !∗!(!) is the optimal appropriation for player 1 for any investment in the 
infrastructure maintenance in time 1. Similarly, !!(!!,!) is the efficiency level given a set 
of values of E1 and m. We can notice that player 1’s strategy in this stage does not depend 
 !!∗   =   !! − ! 1− !! !!    (10) 
 !∗!(!) =   !"#[!! − !  !! 1− !!(!!,!) !!, (!!   −   !!)/!!]   (11) 
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on player 2’s strategy of the same period. Player 1 is a leader and his payoffs are 
decoupled from player 2’s behavior in the appropriation game.  
 
Similar to player 1, I start analyzing player 2’s net benefits to identify the optimal 
appropriation level in t=2   We  replace    max!! [ Π!! ] by Equation (2) max!! !!!! − 0.5!!!!! − !!!!  
The maximization solution in t=2 for player 2 will be similar to player 1’s optimal 
solution.   
 !!∗   =   (!  ! −   !!)/!!   (12) 
And as in the case of player 1 this optimal solution will depend on how much 
water player 2 receives in his field gate. Then,  !!∗   =   (!  ! −   !!)/!!   if (!  ! −   !!)/!! ≤ !!!" = !! − !!∗ − !!! 1− !! (!! + !!)  
Notice that this can only happen in cases where player 1 and player 2 have excess 
water. This is the first possible case (Case 1).   If player 2 does not have enough water to 
maximize its net benefits in t=2, then he will use all of the water that arrives at his field 
gate:  
 !!∗   =   !! − !!∗ − !!!(1− !!)(!!+!!)   (13) 
as with player 1, player 2’s strategy can be summarized as: !∗!(!!,!,!!") =   !"#(!! − !∗! − !!! 1− !! !!,! !!+!! , !  !!  !!!! )  
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Player 2’s appropriation depends on the amount of water that player 1 will take in ! = 2. Since we already analyzed player 1’s strategy in equations 10 and 11 we can use 
the two possible solutions for !! and replace them in Equation 13: 
Then, there are two other cases  
• Case 2: When water is abundant to player 1 but scarce to player 2: We replace !!∗ 
by Equation (10): !!∗   =   !! − (!!   −   !!)/!! − !!!(1− !!)(!!+!!)   
• Case 3: When water is scarce for player 1: If this is the case, player 1 will use all 
the available water and there will be no water for player 2. Then, player 2 will not 
farm in that period: !!∗ = 0 , if   !∗!   <   (!!   −   !!)/!! 
Three things can happen in time 2 for player 1 and 2. These three cases are Nash 
Equilibria of the second stage subgame (! = 2) for any !   =   !!   +   !! and are shown 
in table 6. 
 
Physical attributes and economic parameters in the second stage Nash 
Equilibria. Before analyzing what will happen in stage 1 (! = 1), I want to reflect on the 
incentives (parameters) that will determine which Nash Equilibria players pursue. As we 
can see, it is not the value of only one parameter that matters but their combination that 
determines the incentive structure.  
 
First, I analyze how different combinations of the two physical parameters  Qs 
(exogenous) and E2 (endogenous), when the economic parameters of the system remain 
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fixed, determine different Nash Equilibria of this Second Stage. Then, I analyze how the 
economic parameters are related to the frontiers of each NE.  
 
Table 6  
Nash Equilibria of the Appropriation Game 
 
Case Condition 
Optimal Appropriation P1 
(!!∗) Optimal Appropriation P2 (u!∗) 
Case 1: Water is 
abundant for 
both players 
!! − !  !! 1 − !! (!!+!!) ≥   !!   −   !!!! + !  ! −   !!!!   
  !!   −   !!!!      
q  ! −   c!r!  
 
Case 2: Water is 
abundant for 
player 1 and 
scarce for 
player 2 
!!   −   !  !!(1 − !!)  !!       ≥      !!   −   !!!!  
   !! − !  !! 1 − !! !!+!!  <      !!   −   !!!! + !  ! −   !!!!  
  !!   −   !!!!  
 
  !! −   !!   −   !!!! − !!!(1 − !!)(!!+!!) 
 
Case 3: Water is 
scarce for both 
players 
!!   −   !!!   1 − !! !!<   !!   −   !!!!      !! − !!! 1 − !! !! 0 
 
Physical Attributes. From Figure 20 we can observe that there are three sets of 
combinations of Qs and E2 that will determine in which Nash equilibrium (NE) players 
end. For example, when Qs is high (in this case 1,703 or higher), for any level of 
efficiency, players will have water abundance and the NE of the appropriation game will 
follow case 1. However, when Qs is less than 1,703 but higher than 856, the level of 
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efficiency will determine in which case (1 or 2) players will end. Similarly, when Qs is 
less than 856 but greater than 403, the NE will follow case 2, and when Qs is less than 
403 but greater than 283 the efficiency level will determine in which case they are (2 or 
3).  Intuitively, the quantity of water supply and efficiency are substitutes.  However, if  
Qs is less than 283, the substitution potential of efficiency for water supply reaches its 
limit and players will be in Case 3, where player 2 does not farm in that period.   
 
Figure 20. Nash Equilibria of the Second Stage Subgame Regions 
 
For example, in figure 20 from point A to point B we can see that a change in 
efficiency (an improvement) will change the NE from case 2 to case 3. From point C to 
point D the NE has change from Case 3 to Case 2, we can notice thought that a larger 
improvement in efficiency is needed in order to make that transition. The shallower slope 
of the Case 2/3 frontier compared to the Case 1/2 frontier has to do with the fact that 
achieving a given absolute increase in water supply to the tailender at low levels of water 
flow (Qs) requires a larger increase in efficiency since losses from inefficiency are 
!"
#!!"
$!!"
%!!"
&!!"
'!!!"
'#!!"
'$!!"
'%!!"
'&!!"
!" !(!)" !('" !(')" !(#" !(#)" !(*" !(*)" !($" !($)" !()" !())" !(%" !(%)" !(+" !(+)" !(&" !(&)" !(," !(,)" !(,,"
!
"#
$%
&"
#&#
'$
&(
)*
%+
$&
,-
./
&
!"#$%&0$123$%4&56+2$7+4&27&89$&:&,5:/&
;".$&(+$7"%2).&<23$7&=4&>2?$%$7#&+)9=27"8)7.&=$#@$$7&-.&"7>&5:&
;".$&A&
;".$&B&
;".$&:&
-"
."
/"0"
 76 
proportional to Qs.  E2 is affected by the initial level of efficiency (E1) but also by m, the 
collective investment in infrastructure maintenance in stage 1, a choice I analyze below. 
 
Economic Parameters.  
1. Parameters	  that	  determine	  water	  demand	  and	  productivity	  	  (q)	  and	  (r):	  this	  parameter	  determine	  together	  profits	  from	  water	  use,	  which	  at	  the	  same	  time	  is	  related	  to	  crops	  prices,	  agronomic	  practices	  and	  crops	  water	  demand.	  The	  values	  of	  these	  parameters	  affect	  the	  incentive	  structure	  because	  they	  determine	  the	  economic	  gain	  from	  water	  use.	  Graphically,	  values	  of	  these	  parameters	  determine	  the	  size	  of	  the	  area	  of	  each	  case	  in	  figure	  20.	  	  
 
When q is low and r is high, farmers’ water demand is low. It could be because of 
low efficiency in their production process, or because prices are too low that there 
is not too much incentive to grow too much crops, or because the crops that are 
growing does not need too much water to grow. Then, it is more likely that 
farmers will face case 1.  
 
Similarly, when q is high and r is low, farmers’ water demand is high. It could be 
because of high efficiency in their production process, high crop prices that 
incentivize farmers to grow more crops, or because they are growing high water 
intensive crops. Then, it is more likely that farmers will face case 3. 
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Farmers will more likely end up in case 2 in intermediate values of q and r from 
those extreme cases that I just explained to illustrate how these two parameters, 
by affecting the incentive structure,  affect outcomes of the game too.  
 
2. Water appropriation costs (c): Appropriation costs reduce water demand because 
they also affects the profitability of water use. Then, when these costs are low 
(compare to the income that they could get from using water to farm), there is 
more incentive to withdraw more water and increases that chances of ending up in 
case 3.  
First Stage: The Provision Dilemma 
In this stage, players will have to decide their optimal amount of investment !! 
and !! (the levels that maximize their discounted payoff), keeping in mind the 
implications of their choice for outcomes in the appropriation game, as reflected by the 
Nash equilibrium outcomes associated with any given E1 and Qs.  Players face the 
provision dilemma of a public good. As we saw in the second stage, both players will 
benefit from an investment in infrastructure regardless of who invests. The investment 
will affect E2, and this, in combination with the exogenous supply of water Qs, will 
determine which of the second stage NE cases result.  
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For this first stage there are four qualitatively different scenarios in regard to this 
decision: 
• Scenario A: Neither player contributes to the infrastructure maintenance: !! =0 
and !! = 0 
• Scenario B:  Only player 2 invests: !! =0 and !! > 0 
• Scenario C: Both players invest: !! >0 and !! > 0 
• Scenario D: Only player 1 invests: !! >0 and !! = 0 
I will explore under which conditions each of these four scenarios would be likely to 
happen.  
 
Scenario A : Players do not contribute to the infrastructure maintenance; !! =0 and !! = ! 
This is likely to happen when water is abundant enough (Qs high) or the initial 
efficiency of the system is sufficiently high (E1 high) that both players that they can get 
their unconstrained optimal water appropriation level in the second stage without 
investing in the first stage. This would happen then when (from case 1 of the second 
stage): !! − !  !! 1− !!(!!!,!!) (!!+!!) ≥   !!   −   !!!! + !  ! −   !!!!  
we replace !! by equation 7 !!(1− !   ! − 1)!! (!!+!!) ≥   !!   −   !!!! + !  ! −   !!!!  
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Then, when this condition holds, neither player 1 nor player 2 will invest in 
infrastructure maintenance, since doing so involves present costs with no added future 
benefit relative to the no contribution scenario.  
Second and First Stage connection: If this is the case in the first stage, players will find 
themselves in the first NE (Case 1) of the second stage because both can get their 
unconstrained optimal water appropriation level. 
 
Scenario B: Only player 2 contributes to the infrastructure maintenance; !! =0 and !! > ! 
This will happen only when, first, player 1 can contribute nothing and fully 
appropriate in the second stage, and, second, player 2 cannot reach their unconstrained 
optimal amount of water without investing, but it is still profitable for him to remain in 
the system after making their optimal investment in the first stage with player 1 
contributing nothing. In this case, player 1 will free ride and will not invest. If player 2 
finds it profitable to invest, then it must be true that he is getting some water. That 
implies that player 1 will have enough water to reach its optimal unconstrained water 
appropriation !!∗ =    !!  !  !!!!  because otherwise he would get all the available water and 
player 2 would not receive any. Then, player 1 will have his optimal unconstrained 
appropriation, but player 2 will have his optimal constrained water appropriation26 (!!!") 
                                                
26 Player 2 does not invest up until the point where he gets his unconstrained amount of water because that 
would entails costs that change his maximization results: the last unit of water in the unconstrained case 
gives zero marginal net benefit and so it would make no sense to invest to achieve it.  	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. Thus, they will find themselves in Case 2 of the second stage. Then for this to happen it 
has to be true that: 
 
First, player 2’s discounted net benefits (ψ!) when substituting in his best 
response function (!∗! ! ), must be at least zero after contributing to the infrastructure 
maintenance by himself; otherwise he would not do it: 
  ψ! = ! !!!∗! ! − 0.5!!!∗!! ! − !!!∗! ! −!! > 0 
 
Also, in the second period player 2 will decide the level of appropriation that 
maximizes profits conditional on the state of infrastructure and water supply, which 
depends in turn on period 1 investment (m), !∗!(!).  Therefore the problem of 
maximizing discounted net benefits through appropriation and provision decisions can be 
collapsed into a single choice of period 1 investment.   
 max!! ψ!(!∗!(!)) 
The first order necessary condition for solving this problem is: 
 !ψ!!!! = !ψ!!!! !!∗!!!! − !ψ!!!! = 0 
 
where, 
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!ψ!!!! = w(!! − !!!! − !!) !ψ!!!! = 1 
To find !!∗!!!!  we need to remember that !!(!)∗  comes directly from the previously 
derived solution for Case 2 of the second stage. This is the optimal appropriation for the 
case in which player 2 faces water scarcity but player 1 does not: 
!∗! ! = !! −    !!   −   !!!! − !!!(1− !!(!!,!))(!!+!!) 
replacing E2 with Equation 6 and assuming m1=0 
!∗! ! = !! −    !!   −   !!!! − !!!(1− !! − ! !!!! !! 1− !! +   !!!)(!!+!!) 
for simplicity: 
! =   !! −         !!  –   !!!! −   !!! !!+!! 1+   !! 1−   !  
! = !!!!! 1− !! (  !!+!!) 
The relationship between !∗!(!!) and m2 is shown in Figure 25 
then,  
 !∗!(!!) =     ! + !! !!!!  (14) 
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Figure 21. Player 2's Water appropriation in second stage and his investment in stage 1 
Then, 
!!!!!! = !!!!/!!!!!  !!!!!! can finally be written as follow:  !ψ!!!! = w !! − !!(B+ A!! !!!)− !! !!! !!!!!! − 1 = 0 
 
The amount that player 2 will decide to in invest in the infrastructure maintenance 
will be determined by the combination of the values of these parameters. Notice that A 
and B are also parameters that can be expressed in terms of the economic parameters and 
of !!and !!.  Given the other parameters of the problem, this expression provides a 
solution for player 2’s investment behavior as a function of initial efficiency and water 
quantity. Implicitly they define a function !!∗(!!,!!).  
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Some conditions must be true to be in this scenario. These conditions define 
combinations of Qs and E1 that yield this equilibrium and refer to the amount of water 
that is at player 2’s field gate (he gets some water but not as much as to get his 
unconstrained optimal amount of water).   
 !!   −   !  !!(1− !!)  !!       ≥      !!   −   !!!!  
   !! − !  !! 1− !! !!+!! <      !!   −   !!!! + !  ! −   !!!!  
 
replacing E2 with Equation 6 and assuming m1=0 
 
!!  (1−   ! 1− !! − ! !!!∗! !! 1− !! + !!! )!1       ≥      !!   −   !!!!  
 
!!  (1−   ! 1− !! − ! !!!∗! !! 1− !! + !!! )   !!+!! <      !!   −   !!!! + !  ! −   !!!!  
Second and First Stage connection: If this is the case in this first stage, players will find 
themselves in the second NE (Case 2) of the second stage because only player 1 can get 
his unconstrained optimal water appropriation level. 
 
Scenario C: Both players invest; !! >0 and !! > ! 
This is a scenario in which, water is scarce for both players if they do not invest. 
However, unlike in Scenario B where it was a SPNE for Player 1 to completely free ride 
on the investments of Player 2, in this case it will not be profitable for Player 2 to invest 
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at all if Player 1 contributes nothing to maintenance. Intuitively, this corresponds to 
settings in which water is so scarce (or initial efficiency so low) that a substantial 
investment is required to first satisfy Player 1’s demands for water (recall in SPNE that 
Player 1 must get his unconstrained optimum amount of water) before any water flows to 
player 2. At critical threshold combinations of Qs and E1, Player 1’s optimal 
investment/appropriation combination will lead that player 2 to just break even – any 
degradation of infrastructure or supply below this point will cause player 2 to quit 
farming and yield zero investment – making a Scenario B equilibrium impossible. 
Knowing this, player 1 may find it profitable to invest in the infrastructure maintenance. 
However, the tendency to free-ride remains, and Player 1 will not find it in their best 
interest to contribute any more to infrastructure maintenance than the level needed to just 
induce Player 2 to remain in the system given their optimal investment/appropriation 
decision (i.e. their breakeven point).  
 
It is different from scenario B -when player 1 has an incentive to completely free 
ride- because in this scenario player 1 knows that if he does not invest, player 2 will not 
farm and thus not invest in infrastructure maintenance, and being the only contributor 
will imply less profits for player 1 (because of the tradeoff between investing and 
appropriating).  
Like scenario B, players will still find themselves in Case 2 for the second stage 
game. If player 2 is also investing it is because he will be farming in second stage, but 
since he is investing he will not get his optimal unconstrained appropriation; player 1 on 
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the other hand, because of his privileged location will appropriate his unconstrained 
optimal amount.  
 
Then because, it will not be profitable for Player 2 to invest at all if Player 1 
contributes nothing to maintenance, one condition that must hold to be in this scenario is 
that Player 2’s discounted net benefits (ψ!)  must be negative when he contributes to 
maintenance and appropriates optimally unilaterally (m1=0).  Furthermore, his profits 
must be at least zero after Player 1 has contributed to infrastructure maintenance – 
otherwise Player 2 has no incentive to farm. Then: 
  ψ! = ! !!!∗! ! − 0.5!!!∗!! ! − !!!∗! ! −!! < 0, when m*1=0 ψ! = ! !!!∗! ! − 0.5!!!∗!! ! − !!!∗! ! −!! ≥ 0, when m*1>0, m2>0 
 
replacing !∗! !   with Equation 14: 
 
! ! + !! !!!! !! − 0.5!! ! + !! !!!! − !! −!! < 0, !ℎ!"  !! = 0, m*2>0 
! ! + !! !!!!!!! !! − 0.5!! ! + !! !!!!!!! − !! −!! ≥ 0, !ℎ!"  !∗! >, m*2>0 
On the other hand, player 1 has to consider how much to invest. If investing so 
that player 2 can remain in the system is less profitable than farming by himself, then 
player 1 will only invest considering his needs; otherwise he will invest just enough so 
player 2 can also contribute to the system.  Then, player 1 will compare the amount of 
investment that maximizes his profits if player 2 is out !!!  and the amount of 
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investment that he will need for player 2 to remain in the system (!!!!). Player 1 will 
choose the one that maximizes his payoffs. To be in this scenario player 1 is choosing !!!! 
otherwise, we would be in another scenario in which only player 1 invest and farm (this 
will be scenario D, which I will explain later). In other words, as long as the level of 
investment that just makes player 2 break even is less than the level required for player 1 
to farm optimally by himself, player 1 will choose the former. !!!! will satisfy this 
condition that embodies the optimal appropriation choice for player 2 (m*2): 
 
! ! + !! !!!∗!!!!!! !! − 0.5!! ! + !! !!!∗!!!!!! − !! −!∗! = 0 
 
From this expression we will have a set of combinations of m1 and m2 that satisfy 
that ψ! = 0 of that set, player 1 will choose the minimum m1. See Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. Combinations of m1 and m2 that make Ψ=0 
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This happens because Player 2’s profits are exactly zero due to player 1’s choice. 
Player 1, in this NE will not choose more m1 than needed to just induce Player 2 to have 
zero profits at their optimal investment level.  Once player 1 chooses m*1, player 2 finds 
his optimal investment level m*2 and the subsequent optimal appropriation level (u*2 )  
The conditions that must be true to be in this scenario are: !!   −   !  !! 1− !! !1     >      !!   −   !!!!    !! − !  !! 1− !! !!+!! <      !!   −   !!!! + !  ! −   !!!!  
Both expressions talk about water availability. The first condition is that there 
must be some water at player 2’s field gate, and the second condition is in regard to the 
upper limit of water availability to be in this scenario (player 2 does not have enough 
water to optimize without constraints).  
After replacing E2 with equation 6, we have:  
!!  (1−   ! 1− !! − ! !!!!!!! !! 1− !! + !!! )!1       ≥      !!   −   !!!!  
 
!!  (1−   ! 1− !! − ! !!!!!!! !! 1− !! + !!! ) !!+!! <      !!   −   !!!! + !  ! −   !!!!  
 
First and Second Stage connection:  In this scenario, players will find themselves in the 
NE of Case 2. Player 2 will also invest to bring some water to his gate, then player 1 will 
have more than enough to get his unconstrained optimal amount of water, but player 2, 
because he is investing, he will only get his constrained optimal amount of water  (!!!") 
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Scenario 4: Only player 1 invests; !! >0 and !! = ! 
In this scenario water is scarce for both players if they do not invest, so they both 
have some incentive to considering investing. However, in this case according to Player 
2’s payoffs it will not be profitable for him to keep farming. Even with player 1’s 
investments in infrastructure maintenance to reach his own optimal amount, it is not 
profitable for player 2 to invest in efficiency. Only player 1 would farm and he will have 
to decide by himself how much to invest (Case 3). The result is a scenario in which there 
is no excess water beyond Player 1’s demands.  
 
What is happening in this scenario is that the water supply is so low (or the initial 
infrastructure efficiency is so poor) that the level of investment by player 1 that is 
required to make player 2 willing to invest is actually larger than the level player 1 would 
choose for his own profit maximization purposes.   
To solve, we find first Players 1’s discounted net benefits in terms of m ψ! = !(!!!∗!(!) − 0.5!!!∗!!(!) − !!!∗!(!))−!! 
 Since in the second stage players will find themselves in Case 3, we can express !∗! as: 
!∗! =       !!   −   !  !!  !!  [1−   !! − ! !!!! !! 1− !! + !!!] 
Note that m2= 0. Also, because player 1 will only use water that is at his field 
gate. 
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!∗! =       !!   1+   !      !!   !! 1− ! − 1                       + !!!  !!!! 1− !! ! !!!!      
for simplicity: 
! = !!   1+   !      !!   !! 1− ! − 1                        
! = !!!  !!!! 1− !!  
!∗! = ! + !! !!!!  
The relationship between !!(!!) and m2 is shown in figure 23 
 
Figure 23. Player 1's water appropriation in second stage and his investment in stage 1 
We use this equation to maximize player 1’s discounted net benefits: 
max!! ψ!(!!(!!)) 
The first order necessary condition is:  !ψ!!!! = !ψ!!!! !!!!!! − !ψ!!!! = 0 
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Player 1’s discounted net benefits are: ψ! = !(!!!∗!(!) − 0.5!!!∗!!(!) − !!!∗!(!))−!! 
then, !ψ!!!! = w(!! − !!!∗! − !!) !ψ!!!! = 1 
 
and from 
!∗! = ! + !! !!!!  
!!!!!! = !!!!/!!!!!  !!!!!! can be rewritten as follow:  !ψ!!!! = w !! − !!(! + !! !!!! )− !! !!! !!!!!! − 1 = 0 
 The amount that player 1 will decide to in invest in the infrastructure maintenance 
will be determined by the combination of the values of these parameters. Notice that D 
and H are also parameters that depend on economic parameters and on !!and !!.   
 
Some conditions must be true to be in this scenario: 
!!   −   !!!   1− !! !! <    !!   −   !!!!  
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Water is scarce for player 1, and economically and physically impossible for 
player 2 to bring water to his field. This also implies that player 1 will not reach his 
unconstrained optimal amount of appropriated water (as we saw in Case 3). We replace 
E2 by Equation 6: 
!!   −   !!!   1− !! − !! 1− !! +   !!! !! <    !!   −   !!!!  
Second and First Stage connection: In this scenarios players will find themselves in the 
third NE (Case 3) of the second stage because player 1 will be the only farmer.  
 
Figure 24 shows the tradeoffs between Qs and E1 given values of physical 
(!, !!, !!,!) and economic (!! , !! , !! ,!) parameters, that will determine when players will 
end in a different scenario.  
 
 
Figure 24. Nash Equilibria of the Game 
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The relevance of this graph is that it shows what would happen with perturbations 
in the water resource, issue very important for the basin given that one of its main 
biophysical threats is climate change and a consequent reduction in water availability 
(Bustamante 2008).  
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When Qs is high (in this case 1703 or higher), for any level of efficiency, players 
will have water abundance and thus, no investment in efficiency is needed (m=0), while 
both players achieve their unconstrained optimal appropriation. This means, that when Qs 
is higher than 1703 the game will follow Scenario A. However, when Qs is less than 1703 
but higher than 950, the level of efficiency will determine in which Scenario (A or B) 
players will end. Intuitively, the quantity of water supply and efficiency are substitutes. 
 
Similarly, when Qs is less than 950 but greater than 565, the NE of the game will 
follow Scenario B, and when Qs is less than 565 but greater than 400 the efficiency level 
will determine in which Scenario they are (B or C).  Farmers will face Scenario C or D, 
depending on the combination of Qs and E1, when Qs is between 400 and 313. However, 
if  Qs is less than 313, the substitution potential of efficiency for water supply reaches its 
limit and players will be in Scenario D, where player 2 does not farm in that period.   
 
For example, in figure 24 from point 1 to point 2 we can see that a change in 
efficiency (an improvement) will change the NE from Scenario B to A. From point 3 to 
point 4 the NE has changed from Scenario C to D, we can notice thought that a larger 
improvement in efficiency is needed in order to make that transition. The shallower slope 
of the Scenario D/C frontier compared to the Scenario B/A frontier has to do with the fact 
that achieving a given absolute increase in water supply to the tailender at low levels of 
water flow (Qs) requires a larger increase in efficiency since losses from inefficiency are 
proportional to Qs.   
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In the next chapter I analyze the scenario that the system currently faces, and how 
changes in water rights, increases in agricultural knowledge or a switch of crops, or 
changes in the price of water, could affect these farmers’ behaviors.  
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Chapter 8 
WHAT CAN THE MODEL TELL US ABOUT THE CHANCAY- LAMBAYEQUE 
SYSTEM? 
 
Recalling the issues covered in chapters 6 and 7, and the scenarios examined, it is 
now important to make some general reflections on the consequences and implications of 
the models predictions and its eventual application to practical scenarios within the 
physical actuality of the Chancay-Lambayeque basin situation27.  
 
The efficiency level in the basin is 0.37 and the average water flow that is 
delivered into the canal is 800 MCM28 (ANA 2008, Regional Presidency 2010). As 
shown in figure 25, this combination of efficiency and water flow predicts that farmers 
will face Scenario B (see table 8). The prediction from the model is consistent with what 
is happening in the basin: headenders are appropriating water without any control and 
they are free riding from infrastructure, while tailenders are using all the water that is left 
(less than the demanded amount), and are the main payers for the infrastructure 
maintenance.  
 
One interesting finding of the model is that at the current level of water flow, the 
efficiency level is not relevant for determining which scenario farmers will face. Also, 
                                                
27 The parameters value were changed replacing values using the same criteria of Appendix C and 
were acquired from the same sources. 
28 Million cubic meters	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small perturbations in water availability will not change the scenario outcome. Only if 
water availability falls beyond 500 MCM, farmers will face Scenario C, in which case 
both farmers will invest in infrastructure maintenance (see table 8). 
Figure 25. Nash Equilibria of the Game - Current State 
 
However, changes in the water delivery efficiency level and in water availability, 
may change their individual performance in terms of production and benefits, but do not 
change the qualitative nature of the equilibrium for the appropriation and provision 
dilemma.  
Table 8 
Possible Scenarios 
 
Scenario Provision Appropriation 
A 
Neither player 
contributes to the 
infrastructure 
maintenance 
Both get their unconstrained 
optimal amount of water 
B Only player 2 invests Player 1 gets his unconstrained 
optimal amount of water; 
player 2 faces some constraints. C Both players invest 
D Only player 1 invests Player faces some constraints; player 2 does not farm.  
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Also, from Figure 25 we can observe that the scenario in which both farmers pay 
for the infrastructure maintenance (Scenario C) is very narrow. Given the current 
incentives, it is unlikely for farmers to face that scenario. Scenario C is more likely at 
moderately low water supply and low efficiency situations because in this combination it 
is not profitable for player 2 to invest in water delivery by himself (because water supply 
is moderately low), but there is still a chance to invest together in efficiency to 
significantly increase water availability (because of low efficiency) and still make it 
profitable for player 2. Moreover, this simultaneous contribution equilibrium is not very 
robust in the sense that relatively small perturbations alter it, having as a result a change 
in the scenario situation: either to the free-riding Scenario B (by an increase in water 
availability or efficiency), or to the headenders only Scenario D (by a decrease in water 
availability or efficiency). 
 
In chapter 5, I proposed some solution options to be explored with the game 
theoretic model. The first solution option proposed, changing water rights, follows a vast 
literature reviewed in chapter 2 that suggests that property rights are a key factor that 
affects water allocation and that creates incentives that also inform farmers behaviors in 
regard to the provisioning dilemma. The other solution options proposed: increasing 
water tariffs, and investing in agronomic or entrepreneurial knowledge, are the common 
policies proposed by previous reports (Regional Government 2012, Regional Presidency 
2010) and by experts (MINCETUR 2003, Herrera and Caferata 2009) that do not imply 
major institutional change. These policies, as I will demonstrate in this section, while 
they may alter the situation,do not solve the main cause of the provision and 
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appropriation problem. I explore here these solution options in light of my model results 
and analyze the efficiency improvement of water rights as a benchmark comparison 
point.   
Water Rights  
One way to analyze economic efficiency is to compare how different the current 
situation is from the situation in which the social net benefit is maximized. This is: how 
far are we now, in a situation where farmers maximize their own net benefits, compared 
to a situation when both group of farmers collectively make decisions aiming to 
maximize the social or joint net benefits? Maximizing jointly is similar to saying that 
there is only one owner (or that all farmers see themselves as one owner). A well-defined 
property right (e.g tradable rights to water with no problems of measurement, 
enforcement, etc.) is that which makes the system outcome be the same as the sole owner 
solution.  
 
A benchmark of a property right that leads to an economically efficient outcome 
is that it results from the analysis of the one owner maximization in the sense that net 
benefits are maximized, and thus “there are no benefits being wasted” (Stavins et al 
2003), but there is one other required condition; a “potential Pareto improvement”29. 
Changing water rights may imply both people who lose and a people who gain, and to be 
a Pareto improvement situation those who gained should entirely compensate those who 
lost, for their loss and still be better off than in the status quo. I next find the outcome of 
                                                
29 Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1940) introduced the notion that an improvement in the social welfare 
is a ‘potential Pareto improvement’ but it is not necessarily a Pareto improvement.  	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the one owner maximization. This will serve as a benchmark of a potential Pareto 
improvement and then reflect on compensation mechanisms.  
 
One owner solution. The subscript i for this exercise, will mean land upstream 
for 1, and land downstream for 2. Again, we start in the second stage. 
 
Second Stage: Identifying Optimal Water Appropriation. The sole owner will 
maximize its net benefit considering both lands: max!!,!! !!!! − 0.5!!!!! − !!!! + !!!! − 0.5!!!!! − !!!!  
 
As we saw in chapter 7, for Qs = 800 farmers are in scenario B where there is not 
enough water to allow both lands to use unconstrained optimal amounts of water. For an 
analysis of joint maximization, since this case features a sole owner (with two parcels of 
land, one upstream and one downstream), the farmer will decide to allocate every unit of 
water to the land that will bring higher value for that additional allocated unit of water. 
The sole owner will allocate the next unit of water to the land parcel in which using that 
additional amount of water (at the margin) will have greater value (higher marginal net 
benefit with respect to water). Because water used in both land parcels has diminishing 
returns, the owner will allocate water in such a way that the marginal net benefit value for 
both lands are equal: !"!! = !"!! !∗! = 1.2  !∗! + 229 
And because of water flow constrains: 
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!∗! = !! − !∗! − !!! 1− !! !!+!!  !∗! = 322− 219!!   !∗! = 78  − 182!!        !∗! and !∗! are the optimal amounts of water for any given level of efficiency in period 
2.  
 
First Stage: Identifying Optimal amount of investment on the Infrastructure 
Maintenance. As we saw in chapter 7, in the case of individual net benefit maximization, 
the sole owner will maximize his net benefits, given the best response function for 
appropriation found in the second stage.  max! ψ(!∗(!)) 
The first order necessary condition for solving this problem is30: !ψ!" = !ψ!!! !!∗!!" + !ψ!!! !!∗!!" − !ψ!" = 0 
 
242.5+ 42  ! !!! 99  ! !!!!! = 1 
Solving this equation we find the optimal amount of investment in infrastructure. 
However, this solution does not indicate who should pay for the infrastructure 
maintenance since efficiency does not include equity issues. For the purpose of 
simulating only one owner in the system it does not make a difference whether the 
                                                
 30 As it can be seen from this equation, finding the optimal contribution for this one owner case, 
implies that the sum of net benefits to both players is balanced with the costs of contributing to 
infrastructure.  When each player maximizes his individual net benefit that player does because farmers just 
consider their own private benefit. Then we can expect to see larger contributions in the one owner case.     
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investment comes from one land or another. Yet it does indicate if the infrastructure is 
underprovided or not. As we can see in table 9, when maximizing jointly the total 
investment is greater than when farmers maximize individually.  
 
Table 9  
Compared Outcomes: Individual vs. Joint Benefit Maximization 
 
 Current 
Situation 
Joint 
Maximization !∗! 283 MCM 173 MCM !∗! 328 MCM 438 MCM 
m* S/. 119 
thousands  
S/. 150 thousands  
 
In regard to appropriation, joint maximization suggests that the appropriation of 
water upstream should be less than in the case of individual maximization, and 
downstream it should be greater (see table 10). This implies that upstream users are the 
potential losers of an improvement in water rights, losing 15% of their current net 
benefits. To reach a Pareto improvement, compensation from downstream users to 
upstream users is needed.  
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Table 10  
Net Benefits: Individual vs. Joint Net Benefit Maximization 
 
  
Current 
Situation  
Joint 
Maximization % Change 
Total 140,548 150,761 7% 
Player 1 37,366 31,673 -15% 
Player 2 103,182 119,088 15% 
 
Notice in table 11, that if downstream users compensate upstream users exactly 
the same amount that upstream users would lose (so upstream users have the same net 
benefit than in the current situation), downstream users would still experience some net 
benefits improvements.  
 
Table 11  
Net Benefits after compensation policies  
 
  
Current 
Situation  
Joint 
Maximization % Change 
Total 140,548 150,761 7% 
Player 1 37,366 37,366 0% 
Player 2 103,182 113,395 10% 
 
It is important to notice that this solution is not addressing equity issues, and will 
depend on policy makers’ goals (e.g. policy makers could target a solution, which 
improves current net benefits to both groups). However, knowing that changing water 
rights with compensation mechanisms could bring higher social welfare without making 
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any group worse off is a very important piece of information that delivers one criteria for 
policy making when aiming to achieve sustainable management.  
 
As I mentioned before, these findings set up a benchmark of economic efficiency. 
Thus, policies aiming to improve economic efficiency by improving property rights 
should try to have the closest rules that incentivize farmers to get this outcome. Some 
options to improve water rights are to set up the mechanism of tradable water rights31 or 
to impose pigouvian taxes32. However, these options may not be applicable to this case 
because the government is not strong or present enough to make either of these polices 
enforceable, and because farmers have lost trust among themselves and in the 
government too. Pigouvian taxes are less likely because they imply taxing headenders, 
which are the group of farmers that are not even paying water tariffs. Moreover, 
headenders are the potential losers and since there are low government capacities, it 
would be very unlikely that the government will invest in the system collected paid taxes 
to compensate headenders losses.  
 
Work on trust building needs to be done to convince both groups of farmers to 
dialogue, because, as explained in chapter 5, both group of farmers have different 
perceptions of what is fair. Part of this trust building work may imply giving information 
                                                
31 The regulator sets an amount of water rights as it is done with grandfather rights but with the possibility 
to sell and buy them in a market. Then if the farmer can get higher profits from selling his water rights than 
from farming, he will do so. Like this, water is allocated to the more efficient farmers and potential losers 
are compensated (by sales of their water rights).  
32 In this case a pigouvian tax would imply to tax upstream farmers to incentivize them to use less water. 
For improving economic efficiency collected taxes are reintroduced through benefits to users, especially for 
potential losers.  
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on how cooperating could improve benefits to both groups at the same time. It is also 
important that tailenders acknowledge that headenders also have the right to use water 
from the basin for agricultural purposes. Once both groups of farmers decide to dialogue 
and negotiate a solution, they could have an agreement that should include the following 
items (among others that they may propose): 
• They need to include headenders officially in the physical infrastructure of the 
system. This means that they should have small canals that bring water to their 
fields. Otherwise the only way for them to appropriate water is through pumps, 
which imply appropriation costs for them and no control of the appropriated 
amount. This is critical, otherwise it does not matter which agreement they reach 
they will have high incentives to not cooperate. The government should invest in 
building these canals.    
• They need to talk about how headenders will benefit from cooperation.  Potential 
benefits to headenders may be (compensation mechanisms): no water tariff 
charges for them, the option to sell their water right to tailenders, and investment 
in basic services for their communities.  
• Discuss about tailenders participation in the irrigation association with right to 
also elect their representatives.  
• Benefits for tailenders come from appropriating more water.  
• To avoid future conflicts, water rights should involve not allowing agricultural 
land expansion without prior increase of water sources in the basin. 
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Water Cost  
Other solution option proposed in chapter 5 and that has been proposed by 
previous reports as (Regional Government 2010) is to increase water tariffs. The aim of 
this policy option is to bring water price to its real marginal cost, including environmental 
externalities and other opportunity costs33, and to use the collected tariffs to invest in 
infrastructure maintenance. However, as we saw in the previous solution option analysis, 
this would imply increasing water costs for headenders (pigouvian tax solution), which is 
not feasible. On the other hand, increasing water tariffs for tailenders will potentially 
solve the under investment in infrastructure maintenance if the collected money is 
reinvested, but will not solve the appropriation and provisioning conflict between both 
groups of farmers.  
 
Table 12 shows how the net benefits for each group of farmer and the total net 
benefits would change if water managers apply a water tariff increase to solve the under 
provisioning problem.  
Table  
12 Net Benefits Comparison - Increases in Water Tariffs 
 
  
Current 
Situation  
Joint 
Maximization 
Increase in 
water tariffs 
% Change /  
Current 
Situation 
% Change / 
Joint 
Maximization 
Total 140,548 150,761 140,551 0% -7% 
Player 1 37,366 31,673 37,366 0% 18% 
Player 2 103,182 119,088 103,185 0% -13% 
 
                                                33	   “In principle, if water price includes all real marginal costs, an efficient resource allocation can be 
reached: marginal net economic benefits of water are equal across different uses, and society's water-related 
welfare is maximized.” (Ward, Pulido-Velazquez 2008)	  
 107 
Modifying water prices could be a useful tool for other objectives; however, it is 
unlikely that it will solve conflicts between users in this case. 
Changing Farming Decisions:  
As we could see in chapter 7, the outcome of the game in terms of appropriation 
and public infrastructure provisioning is also determined by a production function. This 
production has two main economic parameters: q, r. As we have been discussing in 
previous chapters, these parameters both convey information about the type of crop 
grown, agronomic knowledge, irrigation techniques, etc. Changes in these parameters 
may affect the game outcome and this is what I am analyzing in this section. As an 
example, I use what would happen if farmers decide to grow different crops, but the 
effect would be similar if the assumption was that they change their agronomic 
knowledge, etc34. Government agencies are strongly encouraging downstream farmers to 
switch crops to more aggregate value ones like pepper, mango and legumes. Near the 
Chancay-Lambayeque basin, indeed in the same region, there are some farmers already 
switching to pepper. Then, I analyze here what would happen if downstream farmers 
followed the government advice and switched to pepper35.  
 
As we can see in table 13, a switch in crops will bring in significantly 
improvement in net benefits. However, even when net benefits for player 2 increase, the 
appropriation – provision problems remains the same. There could be even more water 
                                                34	  Also, note that a switch in crops also implies a change in knowledge on how to grow this new 
crop, marketing, knowledge, etc.	  	  
35 This does not imply that I am proposing, nor the government, that they farm only one crop. This 
is just an exercise to analyze the implications of changes in crop decisions.  
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demand from player 2 because now the water resource has a higher value (in terms of 
crop production value). If this solution is combined with an improvement in water rights, 
the increase in net benefits could be even higher. Again, increasing economic efficiency 
also implies to compensate potential losers and in this case there would be more benefits 
to distribute, and the same recommendation that I mentioned when analyzing changes in 
water rights previously in this chapter, applies for this case.  
 
Table 13  
Net Benefits Comparison - Switch in Tailenders' Crop and/or Water Rights  
 
  
Current 
Situation  
Joint 
Maximization 
and Switch in 
Crops 
Switch in 
Crops 
% Change 
/  Current 
Situation 
% Change / 
Joint 
Maximization 
Total 140,548 376,181 325,088 131% -14% 
Player 1 37,366 21,012 37,366 0% 78% 
Player 2 103,182 355,169 287,722 179% -19% 
 
Moreover, one challenge for implementing a switch in crops is to solve credit 
constraints that tailenders face and that are driving their decision to grow rice and sugar 
cane. Some subsidies or credit facilities to encourage farmers to grow value added crops 
could be some policies to consider for this end.  
Brief reflection of this chapter 
Farmers have conflicts between them because the incentive structure is such that 
drives non-cooperative behaviors. Then upstream farmers get their unconstrained water 
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optimal appropriation level, while tailenders have to limit their appropriation while being 
the only contributors to infrastructure maintenance.  
 
I explored in this chapter how different solution options may change this 
outcome. I found that while changing water tariffs, switching crops or increasing 
agronomic knowledge may improve some farmers´ benefits, it does not solve the 
appropriation – provision problem. Changes in water rights that involve compensation to 
potential losers may solve the problem. The challenge is, then, to identify the 
improvement in water rights and the compensation mechanism that will convey this 
economic efficiency improvement and that is feasible in the basin. The government needs 
to step in to start building trust among farmers, trust in the government, and to start a 
dialogue that emphasizes the potential gains for both group of farmers, and analyzes 
different compensations mechanisms to agree on.  
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In the first part of this research I described and analyzed the quandary in the 
Chacay – Lambayeque Basin in regard to the sustainability of water management for 
agricultural use. There are violent conflicts between users caused by a lack of 
collaborative behavior in regard to water appropriation and infrastructure provisioning 
decisions. Moreover, water management in the basin is far from being economically 
efficient36 which means that there is some room for improving social welfare.  
 
Then, one of the objectives that motivated this research was: to study how current 
water rights in combination of other factors as biophysical attributes, community 
attributes and other related rules determine a certain incentive structure for the Chancay- 
Lambayeque community, and determine under what conditions farmers will seek 
collaboration.  
 
With this objective in mind, and recognizing the importance of institutions for the 
study of a common pool resource management and the requirement of its joint study with 
biophysical and social aspects, I used the IAD framework. This generated an 
understanding of why actors interact in a non-cooperative way having as a result conflicts 
between two different groups of farmers – headenders and tailenders – and very 
inefficient outcomes.  
                                                
36 Since there is not an agreed and concrete criteria to assess “sustainability” I used economic 
efficiency as my evaluative criteria because, as I explain in chapter 1, even though this is not a sufficient 
condition to achieve sustainability it is a necessary condition. Thus achieving economic efficiency is 
moving towards sustainable outcomes (Stavins et al 2003). 
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Among many factors mentioned in chapter 5, cooperation and efficiency is 
challenged in this Basin because of farmers’ insufficient agronomic knowledge, because 
they come from different socio-demographic regions, because they are in a semi-arid area 
of low precipitation where water is even more scarce, because they are growing very 
water intensive crops of low value added, as rice and sugar cane, and because they have 
been affected by erratic governmental participation at different levels. However, while all 
these factors may exacerbate the conflict in regard to water appropriation and 
infrastructure provision problem, as they were identified also in previous research in the 
basin (Alfaro 2008 and ANA 2008, Regional Presidency 2010), they are not root causes 
of the problem.  
 
  My analysis has shown that the institutional arrangements that define rights to 
land and water, and that motivate payments for infrastructure maintenance, have strong 
implications for the efficiency of irrigation infrastructure and for overall water demand. 
In chapter 7, with the use of a game theoretic model it was possible to understand how 
the incentive structure drives farmers’ behavior into non-cooperative actions: upstream 
farmers appropriate water without restriction and do not invest in the infrastructure 
maintenance, while downstream farmers limit their water demand and are the only 
contributors of the common irrigation infrastructure. This incentive structure is 
influenced by biophysical and community attributes and economic factors, but it is 
determined by unclear and non-enforceable water rights.  
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The second objective that motivates this research was: to explore some solution 
options to enable cooperation among farmers and to increase economic efficiency as one 
step towards a sustainable water management. Then, after doing a qualitative analysis I 
proposed to explore with the development of a game theoretic model some solution 
options that are proposed either by the literature of common pool resources management, 
or by previous reports of the water conflict problem in the Basin. All these solution 
options may have initially appeared to be equally efficient, but in chapter 8, with the use 
of the game theoretic model, I demonstrated that this is not true, which also demonstrates 
how the use of modeling methods helps to arrive to more precise conclusions (Ostrom, 
Gardner and Walker 1994).  
 
The solution options which are commonly proposed– switch to less water 
intensive and more added value crops, improvement in the agronomic and entrepreneurial 
knowledge, or increases in water tariffs - can mitigate or exacerbate the loss of benefits 
that come from the poor incentives in the system; but they do not change the nature of the 
outcome.  While these solution options may change individual benefits, these changes are 
insufficient to help farmers escape from the incentive structure that lead to the economic 
inefficiency. Improving water rights was the strongest solution among all explored and it 
is because is the factor that is fundamental to the problem. This finding corroborates 
previous results of common-pool resources management studies (Schlager and Ostrom 
1992, Libecap 1989, North 1978, De Alessi 1980, Libecap 1986, and Ostrom 1990). The 
model suggested that an economic efficiency improvement is when some water is 
diverted from headenders to tailenders. This implies that headenders are potential losers 
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and in order to achieve such economic efficiency it is also required to use compensation 
mechanisms to ensure that both groups can be better of, or that at least no one is worse of.  
 
Challenges for doing the institutional reform proposed are also analyzed in 
chapter 8 and involve: an active role for public sector to act as an intermediary among the 
headenders and tailenders, specially to work in building trust among actors; possibility to 
consider co-management between both group of farmers, agree on compensation 
mechanisms such as an exemption from water tariffs for headenders, or the possibility to 
sell their water rights, and the need to improve headenders water appropriation 
accountability.  
 
The findings of this research are highly relevant in light of the water national 
authority interest to invest in the Chancay – Lambayeque basin. The work could help 
decision makers in identifying where the need for institutional reform lies. However, one 
limitation of this analysis is that it does not fully address a solution for equity issues. I 
could only interview one headender, and thus I could not capture headenders perspectives 
of the problem analyzed here. I suggest further research that includes headenders view of 
equity, economic challenges, collective actions between them and to look if they have 
rules and norms between them in regard to water appropriation. Also, I have not proposed 
any solution on how to solve corruption issues or low governmental capacities that 
affects policymaking in the basin. These need to be addressed in further research.  
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Some changes in the model could be examined to address other questions of 
institutional change that would require changing the nature of the interactions between 
players. This could imply an analysis of how the results may change when player 2 is the 
manager and have some control on the decision of how much water to bring into the 
system – canal; or that incorporates some moderation of headenders appropriation to 
avoid conflicts, etc. Also, since trust building is needed, one method to approach some 
solution options in this direction may be the development of experimental games that 
study how farmers playing games that involve potentially conflictive situations actually 
behave in several iterations as an opportunity for social learning and enhancing 
collaboration on the ground (Janssen et al 2012).  
Other Research Implications 
This research shows how the use of IAD framework combined with a game 
theoretic model helped to evaluate sustainability challenges in a dynamic, conflict-ridden 
context such as the Chancay – Lambayeque basin.  
 
The study also shows the applicability of game theory for illuminating the linkage 
between institutional structure (the “rules of the game”), the economic and physical 
parameters of a water provision system and the ultimate productivity of water resources 
for the users that depend upon them.  Game theoretic models serve a useful diagnostic 
role to help understand the underlying causes of the status quo level of (in)efficiency and 
allocation of resources across user groups in complex systems.  Also, game theoretic 
models help to predict the consequences of interventions by users or policymakers – 
helping to assess whether well-intentioned policies are likely to generate substantial net 
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benefits as well as helping to assess the distribution of these benefits across users.  In 
many cases, these models show that these interventions may fall well short of solutions 
that fundamentally address the poor incentives in the system for cooperation in 
appropriation of water and maintenance and investment in critical conveyance 
infrastructure. In this sense, game theoretic modeling is a useful method for helping to 
understand the potential success of different changes to the rules of the game.  
 
This research also contributes to the common pool resource literature. The 
findings could be of relevance to other similar situations of conflict. Moreover, 
researchers that study similar water problems could also use the structure of the 
developed model to study similar research questions, or to address other research 
questions with models that build on the developed one in this research.  
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How many farmers are there in the basin? Upstream, downstream, for the main 
crops production and of those of high value added? How are they organized? 
How water is delivered? How is treated? How the water allocation is decided? Who gets 
better right? Which is the dynamic for getting water? Water prices? Water sources? 
Groundwater?  
Infrastructure maintenance? In farm? How is it done? Of the system: how does it? And 
how they decide to do it?  
Who are the water managers? Irrigation District? How is it conform? How they take 
decision? Do they coordinate with other stakeholders? How? With who? Local and 
national authorities? Which is their role? 
Soil quality? Water availability? Climate changes?  
In the last several decades, what has been the primary driver(s) of change in crop 
production in the basin? 
Crop prices: how they drive decision / Input prices 
Governmental policies about water management and agricultural policies 
Governmental support for agriculture 
For those who farm in the basin, what drives the amount of water they apply to their 
fields? Is there a heterogeneity among farmers for these decisions? 
How do farmers respond to water scarcity, i.e. drought conditions?  Do they 
respond?  Are they sensitive to changes in water availability more generally? Who are 
more sensitive to it.  
What policies provide incentives for farmers to adopt water conservation practices? 
What policy changes could be made to increase the adoption of innovative and best 
management practices?   
What other changes would need to occur; for instance with agricultural finance or 
government incentive programs? 
What are the most relevant policy changes affecting the type of crop production in the 
basin over the past few decades?  
How does the new water law affect current water management in the basin? 
Has urbanization been a problem for agriculture in the basin?   
What role has the Irrigation District / Local Authorities/ National Water Authority / 
others played in agricultural policy that affects agricultural production?  What role have 
they played in water policies? 
Who would you consider the most innovative farmer in the basin with regard to water 
conservation practices?  What technologies or practices has she/he adopted?  Why did 
he/she make these changes? 
How long have you been a farmer?  
Have you made changes on your farm? Why? How?  
Do you rotate crops? If so, what spurs a rotation, how often do you rotate, and what 
crops do you rotate into? 
What irrigation technique do you use for farming? 
Can you describe your typical irrigation regiment over the course of the season? 
How do you initiate an irrigation event? Is it planned before the season, or do you decide 
when you want an irrigation and the district responds? 
What influences your water use decisions? 
Does the irrigation district limit/regulate your water allocation? If so, how?   
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Does irrigation district pricing/deliveries/policy affect farmers? How?  
Have droughts affected your decision-making?  If there are continued droughts, will that 
affect production or water conservation? 
What are the labor demands for your farm? Is labor available? 
What are the most important issues facing the agricultural industry?   
What are the main barriers for the agricultural activity 
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Tinajones Project Hydrological System 
Tinajones Project Hydrological System components:  
 
• Tunnel Conchano: 4,2 km long, with capacity of 13 m3/s, which increase the water 
availability for the valley in 100 MMC per year. 
• Tunel Chotano: of 4,76 km long, diversion capacity of 32 m3/s. 
• Tinajones Reservoir: with 320 MMC of storage capacity, built in an area of 20 km2 
(see figure 1) 
• Intake Raca Rumi: with a capacity of retension of 80 m3/s. 
• Tributary Canal: 16,2 km long, with a delivery capacity of 70 m3/s. 
• Canal for discharge: 4,0 km long, construido de mampostería de piedra, capacidad 70 
m3/s. 
• Canal Taymi: 48,8 km long, with a capacity of 65 m3/s in the initial part (Until 
Partidor Desaguadero) and of 25 m3/s  from Partidor Cachinche.   
• Devilvery La Puntilla, with a capacity of 80 m3/s  
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Figure 1 Hydraulic Diagram: Tinajones 
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APPENDIX C 
CALIBRATION DETAILS 
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Param. Values Units Source 
q1 342.6 
Thousand  of 
national 
currency/MCM qi = crop coefficient (ha/MCM) *  Yield (tn/ha) * Price (S/. / tn)  Crop coefficient: Herrera and Paz Caferata (2009) 
Yields and Prices: BCRP (2013) q2 576.5 
Thousand  of 
national 
currency/MCM 
r1 1.17 
Thousand  of 
national currency Formula from Kiani and Abbasi (2012): ri = ui *2 qi 
Irrigated Water (ui): Luna Huamán (2007) 
r2 0.97 
Thousand  of 
national currency 
c1 12 
Thousand  of 
national 
currency/MCM 
Own estimations 
c2 24.3 
Thousand  of 
national 
currency/MCM 
Water Tariff (0.0243 (S/./m3)): ANA (2008) 
a 0.01 1% Regional Presidency (2010) 
l1 30 km ANA (2008) 
l2 20 km ANA (2008) 
Θ 0.2 20% Governmental Estimations for Laws N° 27360 y N° 27460 
w 0.8 80% Lee (1994) 
E1 0.37 37% ANA (2008) 
Qs 800 MCM Luna Huamán (2007) 
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APPENDIX D 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD REQUIREMENTS 
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